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Economic indicators for the presence of tacit collusion in merger 
control under varied focal points. 
Adrian Proctor1 
Abstract 
This article discusses how different focal points in a market can lead to 
different collusive agreements and how merger analysis can identify 
markets that may be vulnerable to these potential agreements. Focal 
points based on customer allocation and geographic markets are 
considered with recent UK examples of this type of analysis. The focal 
point firms are using for coordination can affect the transparency required 
to maintain coordination and how targeted or effective any punishment 
for deviation can be.2 
Introduction 
When considering the potential competitive harm from a merger coordinated 
effects analysis is often given much less prominence than the direct loss of 
competition between the two firms (unilateral effects). Even in mergers where 
                                            
1 Adrian Proctor has been a member of the phase 1 mergers team at the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) (adrian.proctor@cma.gsi.gov.uk). The views in this article are not necessarily those 
of the Competition and Markets Authority or any other authority. Invaluable support for the ideas in 
this note has been received from Ioannis Kokkoris, Chris Whitcombe, and Ian Windle. Copyright © 
Adrian Proctor 2015. 
2 Since these ideas were first put together as reflected here in 2013 they have been revised and 
updated resulting in the publication of two articles. One by the Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics (Adrian Proctor, Tacit Collusion Indicators in Merger Control under Varied Focal Points, 10 
J. Competition L. & Econ. 10.1093/joclec/nhu019 (2014)), and parts have been reprinted from World 
Competition (Proctor, Adrian J. ‘Identifying Geographic or Customer-Based Collusion’. World 
Competition 38, no. 2 (2015): 253–280. 2015 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands) with the 
permission of Kluwer Law international. A brief summary of some aspects can also be found in a 
publication where the author contributed to section 3.5: Updated Chapter 4 of the ICN Investigative 
Techniques Handbook for Merger Review “The Role of Economists and Economic Evidence in Merger 
Analysis” Prepared by The Merger Working Group April 2013: 
http://icnwarsaw2013.org/docs/icn_mwg_updated_chapter_4_of_the_handbook.pdf. 
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detailed clearance (or remedy) decisions are published coordinated effects 
may not even get a mention. There has been a recent proliferation of new 
approaches to unilateral effects analysis with different concepts and 
calculations for estimating pricing pressure, but the analysis of coordination 
often relies on a list of factors that may be important in a sometimes 
unstructured checklist of indicators. In some merger analysis only one or a 
small number of checklist points may get discussed, for instance if prices or 
output are not considered observable (by competitors), there may be no 
further discussion of whether the market appears to be conducive to 
coordination or if outcomes may have been consistent with this in the past. 
Coordinated effects may be less likely to arise in a merger than unilateral 
effects, and initial examination of an uncontroversial potential merger may be 
able to quickly rule out both unilateral and coordinated effects. However, 
focussing purely on the transparency and ability of firms to coordinate on 
pricing measures will miss potentially important aspects of competition and 
could miss problematic mergers. In particular, firms can find other aspects of 
competition (focal points) to form the basis of any arrangement to limit 
competition. These focal points may be so obvious and constant to the firms 
that it does not require an explicit agreement for them to be implemented. It 
certainly cannot be assumed that other competition tools or enforcement will 
be used to deal with any potential concerns after the merger has occurred. 
A coordinated outcome can be any situation in which the firms in the market 
arrange between themselves how sales will be split between them without 
leaving it up to customers to choose a supplier. A market where certain firms 
always supply the same customers or geographic areas and other firms do 
not offer those customers an alternative can sustain a coordinated outcome 
without the firms in a market being aware of the prices or sales volumes of 
their competitors. Transparency over these aspects of the market that firms 
are selling to may be enough to reduce rivalry and for competition to be 
curtailed. A quick review of a checklist of some coordinated effects indicators 
may miss that even if firms are not able to coordinate using one focal point 
this would not rule out all potential strategies to lessen competition. 
A market where customer or geographic focal points are transparent may be 
more prone to coordination than if prices were transparent. In these markets it 
will often be clear which firm deviated first from the coordinated understanding 
and punishment can be targeted at this firm. This can make punishment a 
more severe threat while being less costly to implement. 
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In the rest of this article, first some background terms are clarified and some 
literature are briefly reviewed including the main points considered to be part 
of the checklist. Next is a summary of what the traditional approach is missing 
and an overview of the different types of focal points that can be relevant is 
given with the differences between them. The consistencies between the focal 
points are reviewed and then each of price, geographic, and customer focal 
points are considered in turn including an example of both geographic and 
customer focal points in UK competition analysis. There are some more 
focussed comments on how merger analysis can be adapted to consider 
these aspects including how the checklist could be revised before the paper 
concludes. 
Background terms  
If a merger results in higher prices or a market becomes less competitive it is 
not always clear what is causing the effect. This section starts to draw out 
some of the distinctions. 
Coordinated effects arise less often in a merger than unilateral effects. 
Coordinated effects arise when a merger changes market structure and 
conditions such that post-merger it becomes easier and more likely for 
existing firms in the market to collude. 
Coordination is any agreement (whether tacit or explicit) to reduce competition 
between the firms in a market. All firms increase their profits and find it 
worthwhile to resist further increases in short-term profits in order to prevent 
adverse reactions by competitors which will harm the longer term collusive 
profits. 
In contrast, the unilateral effects of a merger are caused assuming a firm 
takes the external reactions as given. There is no agreement or 
understanding established between firms, although in some markets firms 
may have beliefs about how competitors would react to a certain action. A firm 
may consider that a competitor that has lost significant sales volumes and is 
in danger of going out of business may try to compete more aggressively. 
There may be an expectation that a competitor will try to imitate a new 
product if it proves successful. Reacting to these individual expectations 
would be unilateral effects, for instance a firm could keep prices low to 
discourage competition or raise the price of several products to disguise the 
most successful. In a situation where there is coordination firms may engage 
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in (informal) communication with competitors to check understanding of how 
these firms are likely to react or try to influence competitors’ expectations of 
how they would react. Coordination is not likely to be affected by firms 
discussing market expectations and plans with customers (unless these 
customers are a conduit for sharing information with competitors). However, 
even apparently innocuous discussions on these issues with competitors can 
have a negative impact on competition. 
The same merger can change the individual incentives of firms given what 
they know about the market (which would be a unilateral effect), and 
separately enable agreement or enforcement of an agreement between firms 
that can give rise to coordinated effects. A merger could also change the 
incentives of several individual firms at the same time creating multilateral 
effects without there being an agreement. If a merger causes a unilateral 
effect where the merging parties increase prices or reduce quality this may 
reduce the competition faced by other providers who may independently 
decide to also increase prices. 
Collusion emerges when a group of firms interact frequently and conjecture 
that any attempt to deviate from the agreement will be detected and followed 
by severe retaliation from competitors. Firms will coordinate or collude if the 
discounted future profit stream from this arrangement is higher than the 
discounted future profits that can be earned by a period of deviation (until the 
deviation is detected and punished) followed by the profits that are earned by 
the deviating firm in the punishment phase. For coordination to be sustainable 
the gains from deviation must be less than the losses from punishment. It is 
usually assumed when modelling this incentive that there is initially a short-
term gain from deviation for the firm that deviates from a collusive agreement. 
For punishment to occur and be credible it must be able to restore 
coordination such that there is a benefit from punishment for those inflicting it. 
Actions that change the long-term options of firms, such as incurring 
substantial fixed costs, do not make good (reversible) punishments because 
coordination is difficult to re-establish on the same terms. 
When considering coordinated effects in merger inquiries, economic theory is 
used to construct a plausible model of behaviour. However, economic 
evidence can have several plausible explanations and the risk of litigation 
relating to merger decisions can give limited tolerance for uncertainty. Thus it 
can be difficult to support a remedy finding without a very clear explanation of 
the expected adverse effect. A merger can in particular give rise to 
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coordinated effects by making coordination easier, more stable, or more 
effective e.g. by making it more robust or generating worse outcomes.3 The 
European Commission defines the coordinated effects of a merger as having 
one of these effects or making harm to effective competition significantly more 
likely.4 For instance, after a merger firms may gain a common perception as 
to how to coordinate. 
In a merger regulators establish whether there is a mechanism for the firms 
to:  
1) Reach a collusive understanding on the terms of coordination,  
2) Sustain the collusion with monitoring and enforcement including whether 
the incentives for this are consistent, and the reactions of outsiders, and  
3) the merger makes 1 and 2 more likely.  
Often if there is existing collusion it can be difficult to demonstrate the third 
criterion (i.e. that the merger makes matters worse). However, without existing 
collusion the first criterion may be unclear and be unsubstantiated. Even if 
collusion is possible it does not mean it is sufficiently likely. 
The difference between explicit and tacit collusion is that in tacit collusion 
there is a lack of a formal procedure to communicate and settle on a particular 
collusive agreement, it is not necessarily a difference on the outcome. Explicit 
coordination can be very clear to the participants. Confidential data and 
documents can be explicitly shared with competitors and a mechanism put in 
place or an outsider paid to enforce a schedule of meetings, record progress 
against agreed targets, or suggest reactions to competitors and industry 
events. Tacit collusion may not involve any formal documents transferring 
                                            
3 ECJ Impala judgement (Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), July 2008): The alteration […] that 
the transaction would entail, significantly impedes effective competition by making coordination 
easier, more stable or more effective. Merger effect – Increase Coordination payoff, increase 
symmetry, eliminate maverick, increase transparency (especially 3 to 2). 
4 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines - §22:“the merger may change the nature of competition [making 
firms] significantly more likely to coordinate and raise prices or otherwise harm effective competition. 
A merger may also make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms, which were 
coordinating prior to the merger” 
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between firms or an explicit statement of how customers will be 
disadvantaged. Harm to customers could merely follow from a group of firms 
adopting a less aggressive strategy and engaging in less competition for new 
business. However, in this instance the less aggressive strategy is not due to 
internal circumstances such as a lack of finance or high costs it would be the 
result of the understanding and agreements a firm has with others in the 
market. 
The European Commission’s merger guidelines also recognised that 
coordination between firms can give rise to adverse effects after a merger 
without an explicit agreement or breach of competition law.5 
The lack of any formal action (such as passing on confidential information or 
signing a secret contract with your competitor) that marks out tacit collusion 
as anti-competitive makes it difficult to detect and build a legal case against 
this understanding. Even looking at the economic outcomes of a market, there 
may appear to be little evidence that separates competitive and (tacitly) 
collusive markets. The line is blurred between these outcomes because if 
there are no episodes of sudden price cuts or firm expansion it may not mean 
the firms are keeping to a collusive strategy because all firms may have 
similar cost structures with few opportunities to expand profitably in the 
competitive market. Alternatively if firms have reacted aggressively to losses 
of market share or customers this could be a collusive punishment against a 
deviation, or could merely be a competitive reaction to regain market share to 
meet a sales target. Firms may have been learning about the demand for their 
products following a new innovation or market change such that sudden price 
movements could be consistent with a competitive rationale. 
Some relevant literature 
This section starts by mentioning a few cases where these issues may be 
relevant and then builds up an understanding of the traditional checklist 
                                            
5 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines  (§39): “A merger in a concentrated market may significantly 
impede effective competition, through the creation or the strengthening of a collective dominant 
position, because it increases the likelihood that firms are able to coordinate their behaviour in this 
way and raise prices even without entering into an agreement…within the meaning of Art. 81”. 
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approach that has often been taken in the past when assessing coordinated 
effects. 
There have been very few recent cases where the UK competition authorities, 
OFT (first phase) or Competition Commission (second phase), have 
concluded on coordination.6 Coordinated effects have been suspected in a 
few cases that the OFT has referred to the Competition Commission7 and 
where undertakings have been accepted in lieu of reference at first phase.8 
The Competition Commission had not intervened solely on the basis of 
coordinated effects in any recent case until the aggregates joint venture that is 
discussed in the customer focal points section.9 The ideas behind some of 
the different focal points have been considered in some OFT merger cases.10 
 The OFT published a research paper on conjectural variations. 11 This paper 
suggests that it may be perfectly reasonable for firms to have views about 
how their competitors would react to an action. Other actions that firms could 
                                            
6 In April 2014 the competition functions of the OFT and CC were combined to form the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA). 
7
 A brick merger was a reference but was ultimately cleared (Anticipated acquisition by Wienerberger 
Finance BV of Baggeridge Brick plc, ME/2603/06 2006). A cardboard merger was also referred for a 
second phase inquiry partly on concerns of coordination but was ultimately cleared (Completed 
acquisition by DS Smith plc of LINPAC Containers Limited, ME/1647/04, 2004). 
8
An undertaking in Lieu (UIL) was offered in an aggregates merger to resolve coordinated effects 
concerns in the Hertford area (Completed acquisition by Aggregate Industries Limited of Foster 
Yeoman Limited, COMP-M/4298, 2007). 
9 The Competition Commission had not under the Enterprise Act 2002 found a significant lessening of 
competition on coordinated effects until the Anglo American/Lafarge merger 
(http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-work/anglo-american-lafarge, 2012). 
10 A trading platform merger was referred to the Competition Commission on unilateral effects and 
then cleared (Anticipated acquisition by BATS Trading Limited of Chi-X Europe Limited, ME/4904/11, 
2011). A beer distribution merger was cleared at first phase (Completed acquisition by C&C Group plc 
of the Tennent's business from Anheuser-Bush InBev NV/SA Group, ME/4256/09, 2009) 
11 OFT, Conjectural Variations and Competition Policy: Theory and Empirical Techniques 2011. 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/research/;jsessionid=B109EC3F033E31CE65310360213712AB 
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take may be more questionable such as communicating to others what the 
likely response to their action would be. However, firms make commitments 
and statements about matching competition or their plans regularly so 
preventing such influencing of expectations would be very difficult to enforce. 
In the bus market it can be the actual response to entry that communicates 
future intentions or likely responses as much as any statement. Competition 
authorities can thus struggle to ensure that these apparent increases in 
competition benefit consumers and do not merely inflict losses on the entrant 
leading to disruption to services for passengers and no long term service 
improvement. A merger could harm welfare merely by suggesting to the 
market a higher priced focal point, thus the ability to reach the terms of 
coordination may be moved to a more harmful equilibrium without any 
intention of the merging parties.12 
In Kuhn’s review of coordination he notes that incomplete coordination can be 
more harmful than complete coordination.13 
The paper by Compte et al models a homogenous product market where the 
firms have capacity constraints.14 In this model large firms have a large 
incentive to reduce price to fill their capacity, while small firms have less ability 
to credibly punish and cut prices because they have limited capacity. This 
model goes some way to providing an explanation as to why small firms in the 
market may not be more likely to break a coordinated agreement (because of 
the incentive to supply the whole market) than larger firms. 
                                            
12 The paper also considered the effect of firms varying the degree of punishment to the degree of 
deviation and surprisingly stated that this may reduce the range of equilibria that coordination could 
maintain without explaining why lower punishment would be a suitable deterrent to a scenario that 
would have lower profits for the deviator even if the punishment was required to undercut the 
deviation. 
13 For instance, If firms cannot completely coordinate (all quality range and service variables) and 
instead just fix prices in coordination this is actually worse for the market than full coordination 
because firms may wastefully advertise excessively competing away the profits of coordination 
without benefiting consumers. Kuhn (2008)  Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Edited by Paolo 
Buccirossi, MIT Press 
14 Compte, O., F. Jenny, and P. Rey (2002), “Capacity Constraints, Mergers, and Collusion”, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 46, 1-29 
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 In Kuhn (2004) coordinated effects are considered in when products are 
differentiated.15 The larger firm controls more varieties of the product, and so 
has a greater benefit from a coordinated price rise.16 The small firm controls 
few varieties, benefits less from a price rise and thus prefers the price to fall  
giving it greater incentive to deviate from a collusive outcome. This is in line 
with standard models of coordination where the small firms are less willing to 
participate. 
When all firms charge the same amount under collusion any change that 
increases asymmetry (in particular if an acquisition reduces the size of the 
smallest firm or increases size of the largest) it will cause the collusive price to 
fall.17  
 When the colluding firms with differentiated products can charge different 
prices the larger firm will charge more) and it will charge more than the 
monopoly price which will ensure that the smaller firm wants to coordinate.18  
Very small firms will have a minimal effect on the demand of the colluding 
firms no matter what they charge, but will require the collusive price to be too 
                                            
15 KAI-UWE KÜHN (2004), “THE COORDINATED EFFECTS OF MERGERS IN DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 
MARKET”. HTTP://WWW.LAW.UMICH.EDU/CENTERSANDPROGRAMS/OLIN/PAPERS.HTM 
16 Higher prices across its greater sales and thus has less incentive to punish after a deviation from a 
coordinated agreement. 
17 Such a change reduces the incentive to maintain collusion punish deviation respectively, as long as 
collusion is possible both before and after the merger. This result is opposite the expectation in 
unilateral conduct where the largest firm increasing its size should increase industry prices and 
profits. If the market is asymmetric (and unilateral conduct dominates pricing) increasing asymmetry 
increases prices, while if the market is symmetric (and prices are set by collusion) then increasing 
asymmetry reduces prices. Joint and single dominance are mutually exclusive in a merger context and 
either the merger can lead to higher prices for one reason or the other but not for both and the 
remedies are very different to deal with each. 
18 Under full asymmetric collusion both charge the monopoly price. The larger firm has more to lose 
from low prices as these will affect a greater number of sales. 
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low to keep them in the agreement. Joint dominance may be limited to a sub-
set of larger firms where the smallest are excluded from collusion.19  
The Fonseca and Normann paper looks at experiments of pure Bertrand 
competition where the subjects engaged in communication (anonymously and 
to all players simultaneously) to emulate explicit coordination.20 The 
communication helped firms collude in all treatments and often led to the 
highest possible prices being charged, but the tests where there were 4 firms 
benefitted more than when there were only 2 (where firms managed to collude 
successfully tacitly) or more firms (where deviation still occurred even with 
communication). Communication helped coordination even after it was 
stopped. Communication aided alignment on a particular price and was used 
for conflict mediation. However, this experimental treatment of the workings of 
coordination may not replicate the personal and long term relationships in real 
markets. 
The Harrington paper looks at tacit coordination through price leadership.21 
The paper distinguishes three types of conduct: 1) Explicit collusion is when 
supra-competitive prices are achieved via express communication about an 
agreement; 2) Conscious parallelism is when supra-competitive prices are 
achieved without express communication (e.g. two firms raising their prices on 
the automatic understanding that if either reduces price this fall will be 
matched); 3) Concerted action resides between these two extremes and 
refers to when supra-competitive prices are achieved with some form of direct 
communication, such as about intentions, but firms do not expressly propose 
and reach an agreement.  
This third type is the form of communication that could be used in tacit 
coordination such as by unilaterally stating that your firm was trying to 
become a price leader and so trying to influence competitors’ beliefs that your 
price rises should be matched without agreeing with competitors that they will 
match those increases. The paper assumes that a rational firm obtains beliefs 
                                            
19 If two markets have two firms with the shares split 70:30 then merging the firms that are not active 
in the same market may make the two remaining firms more symmetric. If prices pre and post-merger 
are set by collusion this increased symmetry will cause prices to rise. 
20 Miguel A. Fonseca and Hans-Theo Normann, (August 2012), “Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion: The Impact 
of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments”, DICE Discussion Paper, No.65, ISBN 978-3-86304-064-2. 
21 Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (January 2012), “A Theory of Tacit Collusion”, 
www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Harrington. 
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that it will (at least) match a rival’s price as long as price does not exceed the 
highest sustainable price. The maximum price that can be maintained under 
tacit coordination is lower than that under explicit coordination because the 
price leader has to incur a loss in the first period to set up the collusive price. 
It may also be that the beliefs that can be set up about the level of punishment 
mean only milder punishments can be sustained and thus collusive prices are 
lower. 
Assumptions may be needed on how firms choose the price leader. Firms 
with low discount factors will never collude and firms with high discount 
factors can collude relatively well tacitly. Firms with medium or relatively high 
discount factors may have the highest incentive to collude explicitly in this 
model although the model always produces higher prices with explicit 
communication.  
The discussion on the types of communication that can occur during tacit 
collusion is interesting, but the model still focuses on price coordination and 
again abstracts from some aspects of real markets that may be relevant. For 
instance, if firms can send round price increase letters in advance of a price 
rise these could allow price leadership price rises to be implemented 
simultaneously. 
Literature discussing the Features leading to Coordination: 
A paper by Ivaldi, Tirole et al explained the many features that can be related 
to coordination.22 Tacit collusion does not require there to be communication. 
There are always Multiple equilibria in coordination models so it is hard to 
prove theoretically which outcome will happen (to do this it is important to 
know how the industry has evolved). A vertical merger may make coordination 
more likely by increasing transparency. Demand fluctuations create periods 
where there is greater incentive to break the coordination (because 
punishment will be in a lower demand and less valuable period). If there are 
network effects in a market then firms face a high value of growing their 
position and coordination is less desirable.  
                                            
22 Ivaldi, Rey, Jullien, Seabright, Tirole, (March 2003), “The Economics of Tacit Collusion”, Report for 
the DG Competition. 
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The paper discusses a range of types of coordination or focal points to see 
which ones may be realistic. If firms were engaging in coordination based on 
quantity they would have less incentive to deviate and cannot be punished as 
severely compared to markets based on price coordination because the price 
level of each firm adapts to each quantity (to clear the market, an increase in 
quantity reduces the margin achieved and thus the incentive to deviate). If 
firms are producing close to maximum capacity at any one time e.g. airlines 
then capacity coordination is similar to quantity based models. If quantity does 
not move so closely with capacity then any coordination is likely to require 
separate price arrangements to constrain demand flexing once capacity has 
been built (thus the arrangement may focus on the price coordination) If 
capacity is lumpy (demand is constant and capacity does not depreciate) 
firms will compete to be the first to acquire irreversible capacity and there will 
be no scope for coordination. In bidding markets coordination will depend on 
the mechanism. Coordination based on R&D is very unlikely because the 
process is complex, not transparent and not timely.  
A paper by Motta et al defines collusion as consisting of coordination (possibly 
due to communication) and enforcement.23 It says multilateral effects will 
occur when the products are strategic complements. Coordinated effects is 
the impact of the merger on the incentive to tacitly or explicitly collude. Explicit 
collusion needs hard evidence of communication. Tacit occurs where there is 
a common understanding. If the competitive profit level increases (unilateral 
effects of a merger) then coordination becomes less attractive (it will be less 
likely to increase prices). 
The article covers the factors that determine coordination. A firm with a larger 
capacity will have more incentive to deviate, so asymmetry reduces 
coordination. An inelastic market demand will increase incentive to raise price, 
but an inelastic firm demand gives a high switching cost and low incentive to 
either deviate or punish. Retail price maintenance reduces firms’ flexibility to 
set profits but increases coordination transparency. Communication in public 
and giving price commitment to consumers is fine. However, past data can be 
used by firms for monitoring and future data can be used for getting 
agreement. So sharing past information is a concern if it is recent and 
disaggregated. Communication on the new equilibrium is needed to adjust to 
                                            
23 Motta and Fabra, (2013), “Coordinated effects in Merger cases”- Report commissioned by the 
World Bank. 
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a price shock. Vertical mergers reduce deviation because the firm now has 
downstream operations and cannot gain these volumes when deviating, but 
this integration lowers the punishment because the downstream integrated 
sales cannot be taken away. Overall collusion normally increases after a 
vertical merger.  
The article says the conditions for collusion include requiring significant 
concentration (e.g. 3 firms with at least 70% between them) as well as 
symmetry, a history of collusion and information. Thus it is important to test 
the structure – is it vulnerable to coordination, and the behaviour – has 
coordination occurred in the past (are costs and prices linked as would be 
expected in competition, have there been price wars or sudden variation in 
market conditions). A price leadership model can estimate the maximum price 
rise firms would be willing to lead or match and thus the delta caused by the 
merger (under differentiated price competition). Using this model the 
coordinated PPI (Price pressure index) can be calculated.24 One approach is 
to assume firms will coordinate both pre and post merger and calculate how 
much the coordinated price could rise by.25 
The article discusses some European coordination cases and shows that 
remedies have been much more likely where coordination is between just two 
leading firms. The Nestle/Perrier merger would have resulted in a transparent 
industry with no buyer power and the leading firms having 45%, and 30%, so 
a divestment remedy was imposed to create a third large firm. Kali&Saltz/Mdk 
would have left the leading two firms with 60% in an otherwise fragmented 
market. There was an attempt to reduce the structural links (joint distribution 
deal) between these 2 leading firms but the remedy was removed on appeal. 
Gencar/Lonrho would have left the leading 2 firms with 90% of global platinum 
reserves (and in a few years production). The firms would be quite 
symmetrical (costs and share) and have a common interest in raising the 
price. The merger was blocked. In Airtours: capacity for holidays were set 
every 6 months or so but the court decided these decisions were not 
                                            
24 Moresi, Reitman, Salop, and Sarafidis, (2011) “Gauging Parallel Accommodating Conduct Concerns 
with the CPPI”, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924516 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1924516 
The coordinated PPI requires data on discount rates, margins, diversion ratios, demand elasticity’s 
and sales. 
25 Aubert, Rey Kovacic. (2006). "The Impact of Leniency and Whistleblowing Program on Cartels.," 
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 
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transparent (there is an international market for hotel rooms, which is complex 
with many airlines and types of holiday capacity). There was also variation in 
demand and punishment could not happen until the next season (late season 
capacity was poor quality and too late). Entry barriers were also found by the 
court to be lower than thought. EMI/Warner was blocked and then 
abandoned, The Sony/BMG merger would have left 4 majors with 85% of the 
market jointly. There was price and product differentiation but 100 albums 
from each of these majors accounted for 80% of their music sales with list and 
discount prices aligned. The European Commission changed the decision to 
clearance at the last moment but the court eventually said it takes the same 
standard of proof to clear as to block a merger. The ABF/GBI merger reduced 
the market from 3 firms to 2 so transparency was increased, costs became 
symmetric, as well as the firms IP and active sectors. Buyer power was higher 
in France so there was no remedy there compared to the situation in Spain 
and Portugal. 
The check-list approach to coordinated effects became prominent in the 1999 
prohibition of the Airtours/First Choice merger by the European 
Commission.26 This decision was annulled by the court of First Instance (CFI) 
in 2002 due to concerns that the coordination mechanism had not been fully 
explained.27 The Sony/BMG merger was cleared by the European 
Commission in 2004. This was successfully appealed to the CFI by Impala in 
2006 when the reasoning given about price transparency (without elaboration 
on a coordination mechanism) was not considered sufficient to demonstrate 
that coordination was not sustainable.28 In 2008 the Impala CFI decision was 
overturned by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It was decided that the 
standard of proof should be the same in clearance and prohibition decisions 
with some acceptance of uncertainty because the decision must choose the 
                                            
26 T-342/99 - Airtours v Commission, 1999. 
27 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber, extended composition) of 6 June 2002. 
Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities. 
28 Sony Corporation of America and Bertelsmann AG Joint venture decision 2004 and Judgment of 
the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 13 July 2006. 
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most likely scenario.29 In May 2004 the European Commission adopted a 
new merger regulation and horizontal merger guidelines where there was 
adoption of the concept of “coordinated effects”.30 
In September 2008 the European Commission imposed remedies in the 
merger between ABF and GBI which was the first case since Airtours where 
the intervention was based solely on coordinated effects. In this case, 
although the coordination was implemented with similar price increases 
between the firms, the monitoring and focal point appears to have been based 
on customer switching. The data showed that in Portugal there was not a 
single instance of switching at either customer or distributor level.31 If 
distributors and producers could have discovered pre-merger the prices being 
charged by competitors the reduction in producers from 3 to 2 may not have 
made the market any more transparent. A textbook price cut punishment 
could have been used to enforce the agreement both before and after the 
merger so the merger would have had limited impact. However, the reduction 
in number of major competitors appears to have been an important part of the 
reasoning. 
The merging parties (ABF and GBI) had high market shares. Although there 
were some different segments of focus, it was a largely homogenous market. 
There was spare capacity in the industry and the main structural change was 
that the three major players in the yeast market would be reduced to two (the 
parties and Lesaffre). Customers in Portugal and Spain had few alternatives 
to the two firms post merger. Individual customers were small and had long 
term relationships with the distributors (that had very long relationships with 
the parties and were often exclusive). The distributors supported the 
transparency on switching and competitor pricing and competition. The main 
focal point was considered to be simultaneous price increases, but carefully 
designed incentives with the local distributors allowed the producers to gather 
                                            
29 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 10 July 2008. 
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of January 20, 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 2004, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02):EN:NOT. 
31 Commission Decision of 23 September 2008, case M.4980 
— ABF/GBI Business 
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information on customer switching. The reduction in competitors to two would 
have increased transparency over the supplier that customers switched to and 
allowed more specific retaliation. The merger would have removed GBI as a 
destabilizing force (with new patents) that was less vulnerable to retaliation 
due to its narrow product range. 
This is not the only recent European case where collusion may have been 
based on the market or customers that a competitor was targeting rather than 
just their prices or output. For instance, in the July 2009 cartel decision on 
GdF Suez and Eon it was clear that the nature of the (explicit) agreement was 
a geographic split with each firm keeping to their domestic market.32 This 
type of arrangement, where international firms agree not to compete in certain 
markets or to focus on different continents, is not unusual in explicit collusion 
and it may well not be unusual in instances of tacit coordination.  
Many of the aspects that should be considered in analysing coordination in 
mergers and have formed some of the checklist of factors are covered in the 
EC horizontal merger guidelines.33 
A potential check-list 
Although there are clearly defined stages for establishing whether 
coordination is possible or likely, the same market features can be important 
for more than one stage. This list reviews the market features most often 
associated with each of; reaching and monitoring coordination, enforcing 
coordination (internal stability), and ensuring external stability. Often a market 
will have some features that enable collusion, and some that hinder collusion. 
These features can relate to the structure of the market, the demand side 
conditions, or the supply side. 
Reaching and monitoring coordination: 
                                            
32Article 81 decision:http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1099. Explicit 
letters were written arranging for each firm to only supply their home market and these remained in 
force after liberalisation of the European energy market. 
33 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines  (§44-55): 
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For firms to replace the role of customers in choosing which firms should earn 
sales and profits, the firms must be able to agree on an allocation between 
themselves. Thus they must believe that there is a fair allocation of these 
rewards that they can monitor without others secretly reneging or finding ways 
to win additional business. The firms must also have some means to 
communicate this arrangement. The quicker firms can monitor or detect 
deviations the faster they can react and punish them. Indicators for this 
include: 
 Past cartels or a history of collusion in the industry is usually the first 
signal of likely future coordination and is the best indicator that all the 
necessary requirements may be fulfilled in the industry; 
 
 Market concentration. The fewer the firms the more likely is 
coordination because competitors are more likely to be aware of their 
interdependence and be able to relate a particular change in fortunes 
to the actions of a specific competitor.  
 
If the market has many players the complexities in organising 
coordination will multiply. The benefits of deviating on an agreement 
and gaining additional market share are likely to be large for a small 
firm relative to the long-run benefit of maintaining collusion (and the 
current market share). Small firms may be reluctant to participate in 
collusion. The benefits of collusion may also depend on the size of 
individual orders in the market. Successful coordination usually 
requires that the market is oligopolistic. 
 
 Homogeneous products. If products are not differentiated and there are 
few variables that cause customers to switch between suppliers then it 
can be easier to ensure that the firms are not winning customers 
secretly by changing these variables. Thus firms can ensure that the 
agreed market allocation remains intact.  
 
Differentiation means that merely collecting information on a firm’s own 
sales may give very little information on the type of deviation that has 
happened and other parties to the agreement may need to monitor 
several features of the competitors’ performance to understand if any 
have deviated. Differentiation also leads to each supplier being more 
interested in changing consumer preferences towards their product and 
less concerned with the actions of competitors. Some products may 
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behave more like complements over time. Under differentiation, the 
firms may have less incentive to deviate from an agreement because 
targeting competitors’ customers may be costly if those purchasers are 
less interested in your product. However, differentiation also makes it 
harder to punish such deviation by targeting and winning the firm’s 
customers. Innovation can thus make coordination less likely and 
harder to maintain because the firm with the innovative product will find 
it more profitable to exploit this innovation than keep to the coordinated 
outcome. 
 
 Homogenous firms. When firms have similar market shares, capacity, 
and cost structure (e.g. range and quality) they are likely to have equal 
incentives, and thus it can be simple to establish a fair allocation of the 
market between them. This allocation must be incentive compatible for 
each firm to keep to it. If firms are not similar then the firm with the 
lowest marginal cost may prefer lower market prices than the other 
firms. Secrecy over rivals’ costs makes it harder to find a focal point. 
Small firms have less to lose from being punished for a deviation and 
could have more to gain from trying to win the whole market if they 
have the capacity or ability to meet this demand. Ideally the collusive 
profits from coordination would be maximised by the lowest cost firm 
producing more (technical efficiency) but this often requires explicit 
agreement amongst the firms.  
 
 Elimination of a “maverick” is the extreme example of where a merger 
causes the firms to become more homogenous. A maverick firm may 
be more innovative, have lower costs, or may be keen to expand its 
market share (for instance by pursuing management prestige or longer 
term objectives rather than short-term profits). 
 
In order to determine whether firms may have been keeping to a 
collusive agreement it can be useful to consider how stable the market 
has been. In particular, whether firms appear to have maintained the 
same market share over time. Collusive agreements that have been 
found in past cartel decisions often rely on firms maintaining the same 
market share. 
 
 Stability of demand in its extreme form allows the coordinating group to 
predict the sales of each of the participants to an agreement and thus 
any output shock suffered can only be due to a breach of the 
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agreement or the actions of an external party (such as an entrant). The 
presence of unpredictable demand fluctuations reduces the ability to 
reach agreement or monitor and detect deviations; requiring firms to 
gather more information on the offering and performance of 
competitors rather than merely tracking their own performance. 
Changes in demand or unstable price and cost levels may mean that 
the incentive to maintain collusion is lower. Growing demand allows a 
deviator to build relationships with new customers, who may be less 
vulnerable to being lost during later punishment, or it may encourage 
entry. Falling demand reduces the benefit of long-term collusion 
compared to the short-term gain of deviation. 
 
 Transparency of price or other terms of sale. If firms do not have a 
good understanding of market demand and external shocks (including 
entry) it is difficult to tell if there has been a deviation on an agreement 
without information on the sales of individual competitors. Market data 
can be provided directly such as announcements on websites (for price 
rises), or could involve a third party (that may not be part of the 
collusion) including the distribution of industry market reports. The 
history of government regulation of an industry could create a barrier to 
entry. Regulation could also allow for the collection and dissemination 
of relevant data.  
 
How useful data is may depend on whether the actions of individual 
firms can be disaggregated and how current it is (so how quickly firms 
can react to a deviation using this data). Even aggregate data could 
allow firms to understand if a collusive agreement was being 
maintained, especially if entrants were too small to cause the changes 
in the overall market. The presence of industry trade associations or 
even trade shows may provide an opportunity through which 
information on prices and output can be exchanged. More generally 
associations can also be a means of communicating and building links 
between firms that can help in reaching an agreement. Other types of 
market information including the presence of a (likely) entrant can also 
be useful to maintaining collusion. 
 
 Vertical integration, mergers, or transactions between competitors may 
enable firms to monitor the level of competition or provide more market 
data. These can also be a means of providing payments to other firms 
to ensure the correct incentives. However, it is also easy for firms to 
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adjust their behaviour to take account of such structures and avoid 
detection when deviating from an agreement. They could have different 
prices for competitors (or cartel members) to those charged to 
customers that they consider will keep the terms confidential. Vertical 
mergers can also increase barriers to entry. 
Incentive compatibility and Internal Stability: 
If firms can communicate an arrangement between themselves and detect 
when it is being adhered to, the next condition for successful collusion is that 
firms prefer to maintain this arrangement. For this to happen the discounted 
future profits from coordination must be greater than those from deviation or 
competition. If a deviation occurs it must be more profitable for the other firms 
if they punish this than accommodate the deviation (i.e. punishment is 
credible). During a punishment phase the firm that deviated could receive the 
same profits it would receive under competition, but it is also possible for the 
other firms to inflict tougher retaliation which may make deviation even less 
attractive and sustain higher collusive prices (e.g. retaliation could involve 
temporary price wars, or selective actions targeted at reducing the profits of 
the deviant firm).  
Under these conditions, the group of firms that reached the agreement will 
keep to it unless there is some external change in the market. Indicators for 
this include: 
 The distribution and availability of excess capacity. Firms usually 
require excess capacity in order to deviate from an agreement (a 
capacity constrained firm is unlikely to have the incentive to try to 
expand sales). Firms with excess capacity are also better placed to 
punish deviating firms, by winning back market share. This is especially 
true if this capacity can be used at short notice, at similar cost to 
existing output, and utilising this capacity does not incur any fixed or 
sunk costs (such as upgrading obsolete equipment or training 
additional staff). A group of colluding firms will often all have spare 
capacity and this may be split evenly. Firms in competitive markets will 
not build excess capacity that they do not expect to use so this may be 
an indicator of collusive intentions. 
 
 Frequency of interaction (sales patterns and pricing patterns). Firms 
have a greater incentive to deviate from an agreement if they obtain a 
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large benefit from this before it can be observed and punished. 
Customers signing large contracts by buying infrequently would 
increase the gains to deviation. If competitors cannot react quickly to a 
price cut because they set prices infrequently, then this would reduce 
the speed of punishment. Thus with infrequent interaction, the 
incentives to deviate are likely to be higher and coordination is less 
likely to be sustained.  
 
 In an auction situation internal stability is provided by very sudden 
changes between competitors such as the rotation of the right to win 
the bid among the cartel members. Thus a regular pattern of bidding or 
winning that creates significant instability in the chances of one firm 
winning from one bid to the next can be a signal of collusion in 
auctions. There are other indicators linked to the reallocation of items 
and profits but analysis of auctions is not the focus in this discussion. 
 
 Multi-market contact could increase the frequency of interaction and 
thus it can make collusion more likely to be sustained. Winning 
business in one market may happen at a different time to business 
gains in another market. A deviating firm may not be able to arrange to 
win large contracts in all the markets at once, and would risk losing the 
contracts in other markets once its deviation has been detected. Thus 
multi-market contact can act to increase the frequency of interaction. 
 
 Structural links can make coordination more stable. Holding minority 
stakes in competitors reduces the benefit derived from undercutting 
those firms by sharing out the lost profit caused by the additional 
competition they face. Structural links or litigation can create financial 
transfers so, for instance, a firm can punish a deviating partner by 
cooperating less in a joint venture. 
 
 Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFNC).These can imply that the market 
is already transparent and further increase transparency. If a customer 
is able to enforce this then that customer must have some knowledge 
of pricing to competitors. Monitoring of any collusive agreement only 
requires this most-favoured price to be known (which is already 
monitored by customers) and not all the prices. Variability is reduced 
although prices may still vary with observable factors.  
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A MFNC can also ensure that coordination is more sustainable 
because a deviation from collusion (reducing the best price) means 
that this price is not just offered to the new customers, but also to the 
existing customers. This causes profits to be lost on existing customers 
while profits are gained elsewhere (the customers you won). This 
means that deviation is less likely to be profitable in the short-run (even 
before it is detected and punished). However, the reverse is also true. 
If a deviation occurs while competitors are using MFNCs, then they will 
be reluctant to punish the deviation for fear of damaging their existing 
profits. They may also find it difficult to raise prices when they try to 
stop the punishment because this price rise is transparent to 
customers. 
 
 Price matching guarantees can create credible commitments for firms 
to retaliate. The cost of monitoring and punishing a price cut may be 
lower if customers automatically watch for lower prices offered by 
competitors and claim on price guarantees if they find them. Firms that 
know their competitors are committed to a price matching policy may 
consider that they are less likely to win the customers of those 
businesses who can obtain the lower prices without changing supplier. 
Thus there may be less benefit from undercutting rival suppliers or 
deviating from a collusive arrangement in the presence of price 
matching guarantees. 
Sometimes it can be useful to test whether market events involve multiple 
interrelated reactions at the same time. When a competitor raises its price 
other firms may increase both price and volume at the same time in a 
competitive market unless they have also faced a cost rise. It may be unusual 
for a firm that is competing to both raise price and reduce capacity. Thus the 
factors discussed here cannot be considered on their own. 
External stability:  
Coordination will break down if the colluding firms do not have enough control 
over the external environment and cannot prevent customers or suppliers 
using alternatives including new entrants. Some indicators are: 
 Inelastic demand and the ability to raise prices. Even if there are few 
alternatives to the colluding firms at competitive prices, collusion will be 
ineffective if there are good alternatives for customers at slightly higher 
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prices (demand is elastic). This could be because customers can easily 
reduce their use of the product or there are potential imports at suitable 
prices. 
 
 High entry barriers. Collusion requires that the threat from new entrants 
is low. If the collusion is initially successful the higher industry profits 
will attract more potential competitors. If entry is easy the market will 
quickly return to the competitive state. The history of entry in a market 
indicates whether future entry is possible and under what 
circumstances. Highly concentrated markets may indicate that small 
scale entry or operation is not possible given that the other firms 
achieve low unit costs. 
 
 Lack of buyer power. The presence of strong buyers reduces the 
profitability of collusion. Large buyers are able to break collusion by 
sponsoring entry, re-designing the product or buying process, or 
harming the profits of the colluding firms in other markets where they 
have customer relationships. Successful collusion requires customers 
to have few alternative sources of supply, or be unaware of the 
collusion (and believe they are still obtaining competitive prices). Large 
buyers may have more lucrative contracts that could make it 
worthwhile for them to explore more complex arrangements (such as 
self-supply or sponsoring entry). However, they may have more 
demanding requirements that mean fewer reliable supply options are 
available. 
Summary of potential check-list factors: 
Following from some existing literature the main factors that have been 
considered when assessing the potential for coordination are: 
Structural factors: 
 Homogeneous products, lack of innovation  
 Transparency of price or other terms of sale. Timely disaggregated 
data, industry communication, market reports, associations, and 
government regulation.  
 High entry barriers (history of entry, minimum efficient scale). 
Supply factors: 
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 Past cartels or a history of collusion  
 Market concentration, oligopolistic market. 
 Homogenous firms (market shares, capacity, and cost structure). 
 Stability of market shares. 
 Elimination of maverick. 
 Bid rotation and patterns in auction markets. 
 Available excess capacity.  
 Vertical integration  
 Multi market contact  
 Structural links (minority stakes, joint venture). 
 Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFNC).  
 Price matching guarantees  
Demand factors: 
 Stability of demand (unpredictable fluctuations or growth) 
 Frequency of interaction (sales patterns and pricing patterns). 
 Inelastic demand and import restrictions. 
 Buyer power (sponsoring entry, re-designing product or process, or 
relations in other markets). 
The importance of considering different focal points 
This section summarises what the traditional approach to analysing collusion 
was missing. Collusion (in particular tacit) may be more widespread than has 
been found when using this approach. The appearance of price coordination 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of collusion.  
Observing price parallelism is not sufficient to find collusion: 
Pricing patterns do not reveal the presence of coordination. If the main focus 
for an authority is the market price or the price of each firm in the market, then 
it will always be very difficult to distinguish competition from collusion. Under 
both circumstances the prices of the firms may react quickly to the prices of 
other firms. For instance, if one firm drops its price by 10 per cent and then 
one of the other firms quickly follows this could be competition or punishment 
for a breach of a collusive agreement. 
A price cut response could be a collusive punishment or competition. Given 
that the firm has responded quickly it may well be the case that the firms are 
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closely dependent and the second firm lost market share due to the price cut 
or was about to if it had not reacted. The price cut response could be a 
competitive reaction to ensure the second firm continues to meet a sales 
target and does not allow its share to be competed away without challenge. 
Firms in a competitive market may experiment with prices at times to test the 
response of demand and a temporary promotion may be used to determine if 
the firms have judged the market correctly. However, the rapid price cut 
reaction could also be punishment for a deviation from a collusive agreement.  
For there to be collusion it is not necessary to observe price parallelism: 
Colluding firms can still compete in some aspects. If firms are only 
establishing collusive arrangements tacitly it may be especially difficult for 
them to ensure perfect agreement on a monopoly outcome across all market 
segments. Thus even with this collusion it may be possible to observe 
behaviour coordination in one market or product that would be a deviation. 
When coordination is present in an industry it is still possible for the same 
firms to compete elsewhere, so that price collusion on one product, does not 
prevent competition on other products. Even if the market features or firm 
behaviour are not consistent with one type of coordination other focal points 
or communication could be used to ensure that firms compete less intensely 
in the market.  
Coordination does not have to achieve a specific (e.g. price) goal but just to 
reduce competition. Firms have access to a wide range of strategies some of 
which could amount to coordination. All coordination attempts to reduce 
competition and so raise firms’ prices or profits, but the rules for monitoring 
and punishing firms in the agreement can be based on different focal points 
apart from price. These other focal points have different transparency and 
symmetry requirements. The coordination can state how competition will be 
constrained without quantifying the harm to customers in terms of price or 
output. 
Some of these possibilities for focal points could be affected by any potential 
merger. Merger analysis can consider different coordination strategies to see 
if the merger makes any sufficiently more likely, to meet the legal thresholds. 
What is important is how firms are able to reduce rivalry: 
Firms have a range of information on the market. For instance, firms will 
contribute to and receive trade publications; firms will go to industry meetings 
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with local regulators or industry associations; recruitment of staff particularly 
senior staff and interviews provide opportunities to gather information; or staff 
can have social contact including with ex-colleagues and use this to make 
their task of generating profits easier.  
A merger of two firms that do not compete (e.g. complementary products) 
could enable coordination through the links created with another (multi-
product) firm. Thus having greater interaction with a competitor and having 
more potential markets where accommodating or competitive responses can 
be taken. It may allow an allocation of profits that is more symmetric or 
otherwise easier to negotiate. In the same way, vertical mergers can also lead 
to an increased risk of coordination by increasing the information and multi-
market contact that firms have and aligning incentives with other vertically 
integrated firms. 
Information other than future pricing can be used to reduce competition. One 
way that a competition authority may distinguish the difference between 
competition and collusion is in whether firms attempt to influence their 
competitors’ expectations about their behaviour. A firm that suggests to the 
market that a particular action by a rival has brought on (or would cause) the 
competitive response may soften competition more than when firms believe 
increased competition is due to general trading conditions. By giving these 
messages firms will believe that punishment has happened and they can 
prevent such competition occurring in future by behaving in a certain way.  
One way that competitors’ expectations can be influenced is via 
communication both in private, such as at industry associations, and publicly 
such as price matching promises. A price matching promise can be seen as 
an explicit threat to competitors that if they try to win business away by cutting 
price, the firm will respond immediately by matching their price and preventing 
them winning any business from them by this strategy. This can thus 
discourage other firms from competing or targeting their customers. 
Identifying (regular informal) communication may indicate potential collusion. 
The importance of communication for not just making agreements but also for 
explaining the motivation of past actions or altering expectations of likely 
future reactions means that industries that have more informal networks 
where these relationships can be built may be more vulnerable to tacit 
collusion. In this situation a “maverick” firm that has the potential to act 
against the collusive understanding may be a firm that has not been talking to 
27  
 
competitors and does not understand the likely industry reactions to its 
behaviour. It is not necessary for all competitors to be aware of the 
agreements, but in general firms that would find it easy to breach a collusive 
agreement or are more financially stable and able to withstand initial 
punishment will often need to be involved for collusion to be sustained.  
What is reasonable depends critically on the amount of information and 
degree of reasoning power (or computing ability) that players are assumed to 
have. Industry insiders can devote much more time to understanding their 
market and the reactions of other firms than competition authorities can, and 
fairly sophisticated arrangements can be created by simple rules of thumb, 
such as “do not enter against X, unless you have their informal approval”. 
This section has introduced the idea that firms have lots of information on the 
market and can use this to agree focal points that restrict competition without 
disclosing information that is normally considered part of collusive 
discussions. The next section discusses the types of focal points in more 
detail. 
Potential Focal points  
Colluding firms must have a way of allocating the market among themselves 
and of observing that firms keep to the rules of this allocation. Such an 
understanding does not have to state how customers will be harmed or what 
price and other terms customers will be offered but only needs to provide a 
focal point that ensures firms know the allocation and so competition for 
customers is restrained. The existence of any of these focal points in a market 
does not imply that firms are necessarily using them for coordination. Even if 
some of these focal points are not present in a market, it does not prevent 
firms colluding using other focal points. 
The focal point can be used to detect a deviation from any collusive 
agreement and to determine how any deviation should be punished. The focal 
point will also determine whether the agreement is transparent enough that 
firms can tell when punishment has occurred. For instance, if price falls below 
a threshold and some firms respond by lowering prices further, do all other 
firms understand this action was a punishment, and who was being punished, 
or do some believe low prices are merely due to an external shock.  
In some discussions the term focal points can be used to describe any way of 
reaching an agreement between firms. Thus if firms can be persuaded that a 
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new arrangement is better for all firms than the current level of competition 
they may adopt this. Similarly if firms can engage in cheap talk, or bilateral 
communication they can suggest an allocation or influence expectations. The 
status quo may be considered fair whether that is based on price differentials 
or capacity shares. Regulations can provide a clear delineation for how a 
market should be split. Here the main focal points will just be based on the 
type of data that firms need to gather in order to determine that the agreement 
is in place. Firms do not necessarily need explicit communication to reach any 
understanding, this could just occur during repeated interactions over an 
extended period. Thus without explicit communication a competition authority 
may not be able to prove exactly how a particular allocation was agreed. 
Potential focal points for dividing the market include: 
Price or output: In some markets transaction prices are known or the 
industry publishes output by individual site or supplier, this information would 
make these transparent enough to be a focal point. Even if this information is 
not automatically available the industry could reach a coordinated outcome if 
competitors can verify these figures. 
The focal point is about issues that customers care about directly (the price 
they are charged or the volume they can purchase) so the customer harm is 
explicit in the collusive agreement. 
Geographic: If there are local differences in rivalry, such that there are some 
areas where at least one firm has market power, then these differences can 
be used to control the extent of competition in the market.  Geographic 
allocations may be particularly important where some local markets have only 
one firm. Local monopolies can be the most efficient arrangement, so their 
presence on its own is not an indicator of collusion or anti-competitive 
behaviour. However, competition authorities often find it difficult to establish 
the efficiency of the market structure so may not be able to rule out concerns 
based on efficiency. Even if the market did not support multiple suppliers and 
competition was not viable in the long term, coordination could still be harmful. 
A new innovative supplier may want to compete to win the local monopoly 
position and provide a better service. This type of competition would be 
stopped by collusion using a geographic focal point. 
Markets that are susceptible to geographic focal points are usually where 
supply requires physical presence, transport costs between areas are high, 
and firms do not tend to serve certain routes or local markets.  
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Customer: Certain customers in a market can be significant enough that an 
understanding can arise amongst suppliers of which ones have been 
allocated to other firms. This can occur even tacitly without explicit contracts. 
If large customers switch infrequently, or customers tend to use one and only 
one supplier, then the allocation can be particularly transparent. However, if 
customers are changing requirements regularly, or tend to use a separate 
supplier for each tender, then collusion may require explicit agreement or 
communication in order to establish a continuing fair allocation. 
Product/Customer type: It would be theoretically possible for firms to identify 
other features of the competitive offering as a basis for sharing the market. 
Some of these product or customer features would be transparent in many 
markets.  
However, a product or market segment allocation is unlikely to be feasible. It 
would be difficult for the firms to agree on a product allocation (all firms would 
want to be allocated the market niche with the best growth prospects). It 
would also be difficult to punish a deviation because if a firm had given up its 
capacity or research investments into a product area as part of the desire to 
differentiate itself from its competitors, these decisions are usually irreversible. 
Thus it would be costly or difficult to reverse these and re-implement a push 
into an abandoned product line in order to punish a deviation.34  
A customer type or industry sector allocation could be merely a convenient 
way for firms to describe a customer allocation without naming individual 
customers. In this situation, there is no (or minimal) specific investment 
required to adapt your product to one industry sector compared to another, 
but rather than naming all energy firms it is just established that one colluding 
firm will supply them all. This type of focal point works just like a customer 
one. 
These product and other focal points may be possible but they are unlikely to 
be as effective or prevalent as those based on geographic or customer 
sharing. Product or customer type allocations are not discussed any further.  
                                            
34 The US merger guidelines have also referred to “parallel accommodating conduct” which it has 
been suggested could relate to a merger increasing differentiation and thus leading to a softening of 
competition, but this will not discussion collusion through differentiation in strategic direction. 
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Common features in all coordination 
Although the focal point that is used in different collusive arrangements may 
affect how the firms monitor and punish each other, the importance of some 
market features or checklist items will remain constant under any focal point. 
In the joint OFT and Competition Commission Merger assessment guidelines 
three conditions must be met for firms to establish coordination in a market.35 
1) Reach and monitor coordination, 2) ensure internal stability, 3) ensure 
external stability. The focal points available in a market will influence what is 
required for firms to meet the first and second criteria. The market features 
that are relevant to the third criteria are fairly constant across the different 
focal points. For all potential focal points it is still the case that: 
Previous coordination makes coordination more likely. If firms have been 
able and willing to agree a means of reducing rivalry it is more likely that they 
will do this again in the future (even if it is not an explicit agreement). This 
indicates that all three conditions for coordination may be met in the market. 
If entry is easy, such that there are low sunk costs or increased prices will 
attract good substitutes then there is no ability to raise prices. However, if 
entry by firms outside the agreement involves sunk costs then the colluding 
firms may be able to retain control and prevent permanent entry by a rapid 
response to cause the entry to be unprofitable for the entrant and deter future 
attempts. If buyers in the market segment that is subject to coordination have 
strong external options, then there will be no incentive to raise prices. If 
demand is highly price elastic it will undermine coordination. These aspects 
would indicate whether the third condition is met. 
Coordination is easier in highly concentrated markets. A merger increases the 
interdependence of firms with the merging firms obtaining a much larger 
impact on the others after the transaction. Thus there is a greater incentive for 
firms to try to lessen the impact of competition from this firm via collusion or 
discussion.  
                                            
35 CC/OFT, Merger Assessment Guidelines, September 2010 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/mergers/642749/OFT1254.pdf  
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Increased concentration will also increase the transparency because the 
larger impact of a more significant competitor will be more obvious to the 
others in the market. Very large firms can sometimes gain a price leadership 
role where firms find it obvious to understand the pricing practices and 
objectives of a significant market player and decide to follow the strategy they 
initiate. A merger to duopoly in particular will increase transparency because 
any variability in the sales of one firm is very likely to be due to the actions of 
the one remaining firm (as long as the level of uncertainty in market or 
customer demand has not been changed by the merger).  
Concentration can be relevant to criteria one (via transparency) and two (in 
interdependence). Concentration may even indicate that small scale entry is 
not possible so that criteria three is more likely to be met. 
Any innovation or other demand shocks to the coordinated segment make 
tacit agreement harder. If firms have reached an allocation (condition 1), but 
then the fairness (condition 1) or incentives to keep to this (condition 2) have 
changed, it can no longer be assumed that coordination could occur. The 
more regularly the market changes and the more unstable the incentives then 
the less likely it becomes that the firms will be able to negotiate an agreement 
that maintains suitable incentives for all of them. Innovation may also allow 
new entrants to replace existing ways of doing things and so weaken the 
control over condition 3. 
Agreement on a collusive strategy can be more difficult to establish tacitly 
than explicitly. It may be easier for firms to make an explicit public 
commitment to price matching than to convey this threat to respond to 
competition to each of the other firms in an implied way. Any counter-
proposals of alternative arrangements may take longer to propose to each 
firm and negotiate when they are done so sporadically or bilaterally rather 
than in a single group meeting with organised chairing in secret. Thus a tacit 
agreement may require more communication. Although, all of the 
communication will be more subtle than explicit clandestine meetings. 
Communication opportunities will help overcome conditions 1 and 2 and can 
even allow planning to help condition 3. 
Socially beneficial communication (e.g. planning helpful industry 
environmental regulation) needs to be very carefully monitored to prevent 
discussions straying into other areas that would reduce strategic rivalry. This 
is difficult for regulators to check. A wide range of communication between 
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competitors could be used to reduce rivalry. If tacit coordination is suspected 
in a market it may be useful to consider what avenues of communication 
could be supporting the agreement. 
Coordination with Price or Output target/focal point  
These are means or organising collusion in a market that are most often 
discussed in models. In order to distinguish them from the methods discussed 
later, this section reviews their key features.  
Under a price focal point, firms observe the market price or the price that the 
colluding firms are charging and reduce their price in punishment if that price 
falls below a set threshold. In an output focal point, firms monitor their sales 
levels against the predicted sales they should make if the collusive agreement 
is being followed. If their sales fall below this level they believe that others are 
not keeping to the agreement and so expand output and adjust price or other 
terms to ensure they increase sales (and compete more aggressively). If the 
overall market demand is not very predictable or transparent then the firms 
may need transparency over the output or sales of their competitors in order 
to establish if a collusive quantity agreement is being maintained. 
Reaching an agreement can be difficult when using these focal points. The 
proposed collusive price or output level for each firm may be based on an 
assumption that the current (competitive) market shares (outputs) are to 
remain constant in the coordinated period. However, even if this was 
proposed in good faith it would not guarantee that bargaining between the 
firms will reach an agreement because each firm may have different ways to 
determine market shares (e.g. volume or value or time period), or may prefer 
to delay agreement until its position has improved. Selecting a price or output 
level may be difficult because the optimal target may vary over time (e.g. with 
cost or demand shocks), and firms could disagree on the desired price based 
on their own costs.  
To use these aspects as a focal point they must be transparent. Thus firms 
know others’ prices, are able to determine them from market data (such as 
sales), or just sell at a set market price. Industry or firm level output data can 
be very detailed and up to date and may even be collected by state bodies 
which can give the necessary transparency for output focal points in some 
markets. 
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During collusion it is the firms that decide how to split up the market rather 
than competing and allowing customers to make this decision. If the allocation 
established by fixing relative prices or outputs is undermined by firms winning 
business through other means then coordination can break down. Firms that 
seem to be following the agreed price cap could offer additional services 
bundled into the purchase at no extra cost to win additional orders. Firms with 
market share limits may serve the allowed number of customers but select the 
most valuable customers taking a larger value share.  The incentives for 
customers to change supplier must be completely controlled by the colluding 
firms for collusion to be as stable and cost effective as possible for the firms. 
The level of transparency required for these focal points thus includes the 
need for the products to be homogenous, or alternatively products where the 
level of differentiation between firms is stable. This ensures there are limited 
(non-price) incentives for buyers to switch while price differentials are fixed 
and prices are raised. If the non-price (differentiation) factors are not 
immediately observable, then coordination using these focal points, combined 
with the required information gathering can be difficult to do tacitly. If there are 
too many non-price differentials that must be kept constant in a coordinated 
outcome it can be difficult to agree rules without explicit communication even 
if the features can be monitored. 
The models of collusion, based on these focal points show that there are 
profitable periods for all firms during the collusion followed by a period of high 
profits for the firm that deviates as soon as it deviates from the agreement. 
Once this deviation is detected and firms react and punish it then the firm that 
deviated earns lower profits (than during the agreement period) until they 
have made enough losses (at the relevant discount rate) such that deviation 
was not beneficial for them. Punishment of a deviation usually affects all firms 
in the market (not just the one that deviated) even if only one firm was 
responsible for the price cut. It is important that even though firms that have 
followed the agreement lose out when the deviation occurs (both initially and 
during punishment) that the benefits of collusion to them still make it 
worthwhile for them to incur the pain of punishment so that this response is 
credible. 
The key feature of these models is that deviation is immediately profitable for 
the firm that deviates. There are no fixed costs and deviation is just a matter 
of producing more at the marginal cost, which is below price, without requiring 
additional capacity. The degree of punishment can depend on the degree of 
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deviation to try to maintain some level of coordination (price above 
competitive level) to some extent. 
Whether deviation can be prevented depends on how quickly it can be 
observed and reacted to and how much of a loss can be imposed in the 
punishment period. Greater transparency between competitors means that 
deviation is detected faster. This allows the punishment response to occur 
sooner and lowers the gross profits from deviation during the initial period and 
so coordination becomes more stable.  
The extreme version of a response to deviation is an automatic response 
where the punishment price or output changes in response to an increase in 
competition before customers have a chance to observe that there has been a 
change. In the case of price cuts this could be implemented by an explicit 
(public) price matching commitment, i.e. as soon as customers observe that a 
rival has cut their price they are also aware that they can obtain that same 
lower price at the other firm.36 In some markets firms have used pricing 
where they have offered to sell at an even lower price than the competitor if 
that competitor makes a price cut (such as double the difference). This could 
relate to a more aggressive punishment strategy where firms threaten to 
reduce prices by even more than the cut in competitors’ pricing.  
However, often when these statements are made in retail markets, many 
customers will not be aware of which products are covered by these rules. 
Customers have behavioural biases and may not want the risk of finding out 
that internet or reduced range, end of line clearance products, or other 
exceptions are not included and so may find it easier to buy from the cheaper 
location than waiting to return to their normal supplier, hoping the product is 
still available and then claiming on the price guarantee. If customers are not 
willing to go through this process of claiming on the price guarantee then the 
reaction of the firm to the price cut by its competitor will be less effective using 
a price guarantee than if it just reduced the advertised price. 
The models on collusion based on this approach often emphasise the need 
for symmetry. The models require that firms must be very equal in order for it 
to be in all their interest to restrict competition in this way. Symmetry usually 
                                            
36 Punishment can be supported by public statements – e.g. that any price cuts by others will be 
matched. Such statements can occur in retail markets. 
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depends on firms having equal costs or market shares and capacity so they 
share the benefits equally. If small firms can expand quickly and are able to 
gain a large increase in market share by deviating from collusion, while risking 
losing only the high profits on their small current market share, then collusion 
will break down. These models often do not consider fixed costs formally so it 
often appears the models are assuming that small firms could behave in this 
way of rapid expansion. This assumption of rapid expansion may be 
appropriate for some homogenous goods markets where customers are 
willing to move between equivalent unbranded suppliers, although even small 
firms will need a large capacity.  
As well as the risks of increasing symmetry, mergers can often give rise to 
coordinated effects under these focal points because of the elimination of a 
maverick. In all of the focal points discussed (including geographic and 
customer) a maverick firm may be considered such because it has a particular 
incentive for a low price. For instance it may want to improve the 
competitiveness of its downstream operations or it may have a new innovative 
product that it is trying to grow or has some network effect. It could just be that 
the management are such that they have adopted a low price strategy for 
personal reasons. In particular, any aspect of a firm that makes it more likely 
to want to expand and grow than its competitors could mean that it is a 
maverick. So if a firm has low costs it will want to price low and increase 
output. It will also have greater incentive than its competitors to expand into 
new geographic and customer markets. 
Coordination with Geographic targets  
When geographic focal points should be considered: 
In order to assess the importance of geographic focal points, it is important to 
understand which markets may be vulnerable to these arrangements. In 
particular coordination using geographic focal points could be possible when 
the same firms compete across many local markets, and some of these 
markets have different competitive conditions. The firms may develop an 
understanding to limit the extent of direct (actual) competition in some of 
those local markets. An industry is particularly vulnerable to geographic focal 
points if some local markets have only one major or national operator and the 
other major operators would face some barriers to entering into these local 
markets. Either because of fixed costs or because local demand is not 
enough to support additional large operators in the long term.   
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Lack of entry into a local market is the normal default position and so, on its 
own, this cannot be taken as an indicator of collusion. Similarly, if some entry 
is observed in a market, this does not mean that geographic focal points are 
not being used to soften competition, because the entry could be by a firm, or 
on an area that is not part of any agreement. 
Collusion with geographic focal points: 
An agreed allocation of a market based on geographic boundaries may be 
much more obvious to competitors than cost levels and so more prone to 
being agreed tacitly and more transparent when being monitored. Physical 
presence (geographic location) in an area is usually transparent. The focal 
point may merely state that the current (historic) split of local markets should 
be maintained (the current competitive and future coordinated geographic 
allocation will be the same and relatively stable over time). The main 
difference between these competitive states once the understanding is in 
place is the level of threat posed by potential entry. Under the collusive 
agreement the colluding firms avoid entry into others’ areas.  
Geographic focal point formation requires firms to know which areas are 
reserved by competitors and will be defended with retaliation. If the 
geographic split is more complex, more communication may be required to 
establish the allocation. In many industries the managers will have become 
expert in the structure of the market over decades and so may still be able to 
establish complex arrangements tacitly (without an explicit agreement). 
The current competitive geographic allocation or location of operations (status 
quo) may be relatively stable and for the firms to negotiate keeping to this 
outcome does not require them to make assumptions about confidential data. 
This is different to price focal points based on unobservable costs where the 
competitive and collusive level or target can be constantly adjusting to cost 
shocks. The ideal monopoly or collusive price could be different for each firm 
and very different from any price charged before coordination started. Under 
geographic focal points, ensuring an equal allocation is based on (publically) 
observable characteristics, like places or the population density of those 
places, and not unobservable features such as firms’ costs, sales, or prices. 
Confidential data does not have to be exchanged. Tacit agreement or 
suggestion of a geographic focal point may be more likely than for a price 
focal point. 
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If there is a deviation from a geographic allocation (i.e. a coordinating firm 
enters into an area reserved by another coordinating firm), then not only the 
fact that there has been a deviation, but also the identity of the deviating firm 
can be easily established publically. Punishment can be targeted at that firm 
by counter entry into a local market that is particularly profitable to the firm 
that deviated. Alternatively punishment could target that firm’s operations in 
the route or area they expanded into (this would appear to be a very usual 
response in terms of defending against entry into a market where the victim of 
the deviation is strong). These strategies limit the costs of the punishment to 
the punishing firm(s) because they do not waste resources expanding across 
the whole market and entering into the areas reserved by other firms.  The 
remaining firms can continue to coordinate unaffected by the punishment of 
one firm in a few areas (or they could also carry out targeted punishment 
against this firm without reducing their profits on their existing markets). 
In the price focal points section, it was explained that some economic models 
of coordination assume the firm that deviates makes profits in the first period. 
In those models no fixed costs are incurred when lowering price and 
increasing output. However, in markets with geographic allocation, the 
deviation is not merely producing more of the same output. The output is 
being produced in a different market where customers have not previously 
been able to buy that product and the supplier has not been competing.  
Extension into new geographic markets (or customer requirements) may 
involve some fixed costs. An expansion by a firm deviating from a collusive 
agreement may have been profitable in a competitive market, or in a market 
where there was no reaction to the expansion by competitors. The fixed costs 
mean that even under competitive conditions the expansion may not generate 
a profit initially (i.e. only after the market or demand has been built up does 
the increase in sales from the expansion pay for the original investment).  
This delay in profitability can make it easier to sustain collusion via 
punishment. When the colluding firms find out about the deviation and react to 
it, the deviating firm may still be in a position where it has made a loss, so far, 
from the deviation. In this case, it is the same as the firms reacting and 
punishing immediately (or in anticipation) of a deviation. The punishments 
made by other firms may also take a while for them to generate sufficient 
demand to mean that they generate the long-term expected revenues for the 
firms doing the punishing (or get full efficiency), but they will have an 
immediate impact on the demand for the deviator’s operations (for instance by 
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lowering price and willingness to pay). Thus punishment can still be carried 
out promptly despite the delay in deviation profits. Thus it is unlikely that firms 
that are punished in this way can make a profit by entering reserved routes 
and they will be encouraged to keep to any understanding. 
Merger impact: 
A merger could cause geographic coordination to become more likely. For 
instance a merger could remove a maverick. Normally a maverick has low 
variable costs, but in this model where fixed costs of entering new routes can 
be non-trivial, low fixed costs of route entry may also make firm a maverick. If 
a firm was renting a lot of its assets it may be able to enter and make profits in 
a reserved route and then exit again when punishment intensified. It may still 
generate sufficient profits to be incentivised to carry out such short-term entry. 
There are other aspects that could be important. A firm may be regarded as a 
maverick if it was not a member of a trade association or did not otherwise get 
involved in communication and thus did not know the local agreed allocations. 
Failing to discuss the understanding with competitors may make it more likely 
to enter into areas that others would not. Alternatively the maverick may be 
based in an areas that are particularly valuable to other firms (pose a high risk 
to them) and have lower costs associated with expanding in those high value 
areas. 
The firms in a market may not be symmetrical. Some firms may not be 
vulnerable because they do not have areas at risk of punishment. A merger 
that makes the geographic boundary between two firms more complex could 
still make coordination more sustainable by increasing the credible threats 
one firm has against the most profitable markets of another. This would be 
particularly likely in markets like buses where presence in the region or 
nearby makes it easier for a firm to enter any specific local market (or route). 
By acquiring a small operator with a depot in a different part of the city an 
operator may greatly reduce the costs of running buses on the key routes of a 
coordinating bus company and thus discourage that firm from trying to expand 
on to its profitable routes by the increased threat. 
Does this mean that all new entrants to an area will be mavericks? After all, if 
deviation is by a new entrant they will not have existing local monopolies that 
could be punished. Not necessarily. New entrants to an area may only be able 
to grow slowly because they have limited capital resources. They may have 
higher costs than existing firms associated with any expansion including fixed 
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and sunk costs, particularly if they are smaller firms that do not have spare 
assets or management resources from a national pool or established 
procedures for setting up new operations. Any deviation gains may be short-
lived because they may not have the resources to withstand punishment for 
long and, the total profits they gain from the entry can be negative. Thus if 
these firms cannot gain much in additional profits by deviating and trying to 
expand slowly, they may need relatively little compensation for resisting 
expansion. Entrants may prefer to coordinate as long as they have some 
small local operations with positive profits that are reserved for them. 
In order for a regulator to distinguish a competitive response to increased 
competition (such as market share recovery), from a potentially anti-
competitive response such as punishment, one indicator may be whether the 
market share recapture is targeted at the firm that originally increased 
competition. In a competitive market it is normal for a firm to want to respond 
to a loss of its market share or sales, but this response is on the basis of 
expanding profits and sales. The firm will normally go after the most profitable 
or easily available business opportunities wherever they are. In a collusive 
model, the firm is not just going after any business, they are inflicting a 
punishment. Thus it is important for the new business to be at the expense of 
the firm that caused the loss in its original business. 
Targeting punishment against a firm or area is easier in geographic or 
customer coordination. If firms have been allocated certain areas where they 
will make more profits, then those areas are open to retaliation. Targeting this 
area can also make the punishment more severe (because it the particular 
firm that deviated is impacted more quickly) while being less costly to the firm 
doing the punishing (which should avoid harm to its own reserved areas). This 
will thus increase internal stability. 
Geographic focal points in the Bus Market 
An example of where firms may have been using their geographic location to 
limit rivalry is in the bus market in North East England.  
After privatisation of the UK bus market many local areas had operators with a 
strong presence (i.e. the former state owned monopolies that were now in 
private ownership). Competition should have encouraged cross entry where 
these local operators entered into adjacent areas and also faced entry from 
other local operators. This type of entry should be cost effective in the bus 
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industry because entry onto routes in a local area can be done at a lower cost 
if the entrant has a local depot or network. The entrant will not have to pay 
overheads to establish somewhere to maintain and clean their buses and they 
will have less “dead” mileage to pay where the buses are not earning money 
but are just being driven to or from the depot and the start of the route each 
morning or evening. 
The UK Competition Commission Bus market study, found evidence of 
possible coordination in the NorthEast (around Newcastle upon Tyne).37 
According to the case study into this evidence, two firms, each with bus 
depots in Newcastle in close proximity, may have had more than 20 contacts 
per year.38 These contacts could have been direct phone calls, or meetings 
as part of associations or industry gatherings. This communication helped to 
ensure the bus firms would understand their rival’s likely responses to entry 
on certain routes. There is no evidence that they discussed prices, costs, or 
other (non-geographic) focal points. 
Bus firms in this market reached and monitored the agreement by observing 
the routes each firm operated and communicating to key competitors which 
routes were core to their network (reserved) and would provoke retaliation in 
response to entry. This core territory was mostly determined by the historic 
allocation. The allocation only had to be understood by some competitors. 
The bus operators retaliated against significant entry either on the same route 
where the entry had occurred or the core routes elsewhere in the region of the 
operator that had deviated. Bus companies are managed locally by a regional 
operating entity and so the understanding was between regional level 
management of the different bus companies. 
The arrangement was internally stable because firms with local depots that 
could easily enter a rival’s core routes were discouraged from this action by 
the punishment response this would trigger on their important routes in the 
area.  It was important that these large firms understood the routes they could 
                                            
37 CC Local Bus Services, Addendum to provisional findings on geographic market segregation and 
operator conduct  http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2010/localbus/addendum_to_provisional_findings.htm 
38 Annex 1 para 144, 70 contacts in three years. 
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not enter because it would be difficult to remove them from one of these 
routes, if they entered in error, due to their strong financial position. 
The arrangement was externally stable. Smaller firms did not have profitable 
local networks at risk of punishment. However, these small firms incurred 
greater fixed costs in entering a core route and were less able to withstand 
aggressive competition after they entered. Thus new entry did not pose 
enough of a risk to undermine the arrangement. 
Some of the internal documents discussed different strategies for one of the 
parties to maintain these arrangements. For instance, there was a strategy of 
‘shield’ where the plan was to increase the spending on their existing routes 
and make them less vulnerable to entry (deviation) by the other firm. This 
included upgrading buses and increasing frequency. There was a strategy of 
‘sword’ which required entry into nearby markets of the other firm and so 
could be used either as a deviation from the understanding or as punishment 
response if any deviation did occur. 
The firm also discussed a strategy called ‘spears’ where the coordinating firm 
acquires small firms with depots in its rival’s territory.  The spears strategy 
was to seek opportunities to extend competitive action to the other firm’s core 
urban areas that were currently beyond reach of the firms existing depots.39  
These spears acquisitions would make the geographic boundary between the 
core routes of the coordinating firms more complex (which may require more 
communication, although an existing understanding of the importance of 
these areas was the reason for the acquisition). The purpose of spears was to 
increase the credible entry threat the firm would have against its rival’s key 
routes. If the firm was able to inflict a larger punishment over a larger area by 
efficiently running buses from key depots, then the losses the other firm could 
expect to suffer if it deviated would be larger. The co-ordinated understanding 
would thus become more stable and less likely to be violated. This is an 
example of multimarket contact increasing scope for coordination. By 
extending the geographic markets where both regional bus operators are 
active (or could be at low cost) any one deviation profit appears small 
compared to the potential punishment in many markets or routes.  
                                            
39 Annex 1 para 78 
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Thus one way a merger could make a tacit understanding more stable or 
effective would be to provide a credible entry threat to retaliate against a 
competitor and balance the power in a market. 
Coordination with Customer targets  
Another aspect of the competition in a market that may be very stable and 
firms in that market may find transparent, is the key customers served by 
each firm. In some industries some of the largest customers will have long 
term relationships with their suppliers and these may even be the sole 
supplier to them of this product. It may be easy for firms to arrange to not 
compete for the key customers of their competitors in return for facing less 
pressure to compete for their current customers. Such an understanding may 
not require an explicit or written agreement. For this focal point to be possible 
requires firms to have some significant long term customers.  
The understanding may be limited just to the larger customers in an industry if 
these customers do not have sufficient alternatives to the colluding firms (for 
example, they cannot self-supply or import). If many firms are single sourcing, 
then this will increase transparency in a market and enable a better 
understanding of the customer relationships to emerge and so an 
understanding between firms can affect more of the market. If the effect of 
collusion is limited to only a few firms such as the largest ones then there 
must be something to stop these firms losing significant share to other 
purchasers of the input that are not facing higher input costs. This could be 
because the larger firms have lower costs elsewhere or they may be in a 
different market segment to the smaller (maybe specialised) purchasers. 
In order to follow this focal point, the firms form an understanding that certain 
customers are allocated to particular firms (or shared between certain firms). 
Firms can undertake any competition that they want in the market as long as 
they do not break the understanding and take one of the reserved customers 
from the other members of the collusive understanding. To realise that there 
has been a deviation does not require the victim to know what price deviation 
occurred, such as what price was offered to the lost customer, but only that a 
particular customer has been lost to a competitor and has not left the market. 
When a reserved customer is lost (switches to another coordinating supplier) 
it may be possible for the firm to detect which competitor has won the 
customer (who they switched to). Thus any punishment can be targeted on 
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that firm by approaching the same customer or the other customers of that 
firm, which may even be in the same region where the deviation occurred.  
This type of punishment (where tailored offers are made to specific potential 
customers) can be kept separate from the rest of the market, because other 
customers will not be aware that these offers are available. Thus competition 
for the customers of the firm that deviated does not have to harm the other 
suppliers in the market because their customers are unaffected. Collusion in 
the rest of the market with the other firms does not have to be affected. This 
type of punishment can be done with minimal additional capacity because a 
firm that has lost a major customer merely has to target growth in sales at a 
couple of customers of the firm that is being punished. There is no need to 
flood the whole market with products. 
A merger could make a customer allocation understanding more likely. 
Eliminating a maverick is again one option, and in the same way as 
geographic focal points, in order to participate in a customer focal point firms 
must engage in communication of some sort to establish which customers are 
the reserved customers. Thus firms that do not participate in communication 
can be mavericks. 
If there are long-term contracts enforced in a market such that customers 
cannot move to a cheaper product mid-contract then this can create 
complexities. These have two impacts. They increase the incentive to deviate 
because each customer gained can be more valuable. However, they can 
also limit the growth a maverick achieves before being punished because 
there will be few customers available to win. The market will be more 
transparent if there are such contracts because the relationships between 
suppliers and customers will be clearer. If only one firm has long term 
contracts with its customers this firm may be a maverick because it is less 
vulnerable to punishment or retaliation than the other firms in the market and 
so more likely to deviate from the understanding.  
In some markets customers require a combination of suppliers that can 
provide a full range of products. Some of the larger suppliers may be able to 
provide a full range on their own and thus attempt to achieve a position as the 
sole supplier at a customer. However, smaller suppliers may only supply 
some of the required range and so tend to end up being one of a few 
suppliers to a customer. If a sole supplier to a firm is replaced by more than 
one supplier, it is not clear to the firm that has been replaced which of the new 
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suppliers reduced the price or increased competition to cause that option to 
be selected. Thus it is harder to tell which firm deviated from the 
understanding. 
Removing from the market firms that rely on multi-sourcing by customers can 
increase the transparency firms have over any deviations or customer 
switching incentives. This will allow punishment to be targeted more 
accurately. If this removal of a competitor is done via an acquisition it may 
also increase the barriers to entry for other firms with narrow product 
offerings. The fewer suppliers that are keen to offer favourable deals to 
customers to encourage them to split their requirements between two 
suppliers, the less likely customers will choose these options. Other suppliers 
will all be making discounts to encourage sole supply rather than to 
encourage multi-sourcing. Thus if a merger causes the ranges of the products 
to be more symmetrical (particularly where sole suppliers are often chosen), 
or eliminates a firm that was making the market less transparent with fewer 
sole suppliers, then it may increase the risk of collusion. 
Customer focal points in the Ready-mix Concrete Market 
An example of where firms have been allegedly tacitly allocating some 
customers among themselves is the ready-mix concrete market. 
In 2012 the Competition Commission (CC) found during a merger inquiry that 
the cement markets were at risk of coordination and the novel vertical aspects 
of the market led to a divestment not only of the upstream operations but of a 
network of downstream production sites.40 The market had exhibited several 
warning signs of coordination. Price and margin had risen even as excess 
capacity had increased when demand was falling in 2007-2010. There were 
stable shares of production despite shocks, with changes to demand and 
industry structure. The econometric analysis did not show any local impacts of 
competition, in particular the presence of competitors Hansen or Cemex 
within 50 miles did not reduce the price of cement. Several producers’ internal 
documents said vertical integration and the merger had a stabilising effect. 
Punishment in the market could involve upstream price reductions (targeted to 
                                            
40 Bon, Crocioni, Sala. (Dec 2013), “There is always a first time: Coordinated effects via Vertical 
Structural changes in Anglo/Lafarge”, Competition Policy International. 
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avoid harming their own downstream operations) or reducing downstream 
prices. 
If competitors support a merger, tend to target any competitor that wins a 
contract or appear to aim for a constant (rather than increasing) market share 
then this could be a sign of potential concern. Refusals to quote or supply and 
limited marketing to customers served by competitors can be indicative, but 
may be difficult to distinguish from other reasons for not bidding. 
The merger made reaching and monitoring coordination easier because it 
reduced the number of firms with each having a larger incentive or market 
share. The acquirer could also use the extra downstream information to detect 
deviations (even if its small downstream network pre-merger meant this had 
not been worthwhile). 
Internal incentive would be easier when more vertically integrated with all 
three post-merger having an equal risk of punishment (taking account of the 
internal or protected sales). It would be easier to target a deviating firm in 
downstream areas with the larger downstream network. The acquirer was not 
likely to cheat downstream due to the larger gains upstream.41 The merger 
may also have made upstream unit production costs more equal. 
The merger of the UK operations of AngloAmerican (Tarmac) and Lafarge via 
a joint venture was referred for a phase two investigation partly because it 
was considered that there was a realistic prospect of the merger creating or 
strengthening tacit coordination in cement. The Competition Commission 
found that coordination was also a concern at second phase and required the 
divestment of a vertically integrated cement producer with downstream ready-
mix concrete operations. The divestment was intended to leave the UK 
cement and concrete markets in a similar competitive state as they would 
                                            
41 The acquirer would now have fewer customers to attract by deviating upstream due to having 
lower spare capacity while competitors had the same number of customers that could be  won by 
deviating (the integrated target firm was supplying most of its requirements internally). If 
coordination was pre-existing it did not include the target who was acting more like a price taker in 
the competitive fringe and was generally near full capacity. The merger would remove the target as a 
fringe external competitor (that could have further increased capacity in the mid to long term). 
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have been without the merger, but allow the other aspects of the joint venture 
to proceed.42 
The merger parties were two of four vertically integrated UK cement 
producers. Cement is used in ready-mix concrete, blocks, and tiles. In the 
market there are traditionally long-term customers where a single cement 
producer can supply a significant customer with all their cement for many 
years with only rare price negotiation. There had been complaints of refusal to 
supply and parallel pricing by suppliers with some customers believing they 
were allocated to suppliers. Margins in the industry were relatively high and 
stable. 
At first phase the OFT found that cement transaction prices did not appear to 
be transparent. This was despite the fact that several cement suppliers 
seemed to send letters to all their customers at the same time of year 
announcing similar price rises across all firms that always resulted in price 
rises. The cement producers could tell what price they (or their joint ventures) 
were being charged for cement when they were buying from the competitors 
for their downstream operations (or were selling to them) in cross purchasing. 
However, this would not necessarily indicate that the same prices were 
charged to independent customers. There was some detailed but possibly 
incomplete information on output of particular plants but with all the internal 
demand, stocks, imports, and uncertainty over market demand this did not 
appear to result in a stable transparent market. Thus it was not possible to 
detect deviation from a collusive agreement from these price indicators. It was 
not clear how a price focal point would work in this market. In order to reach 
and monitor coordination firms may have been relying on detecting customer 
switching.43 
Some of the firms in the cement market had relatively limited amounts of 
spare capacity. However, collusive arrangements could still be internally 
stable even if capacity was allocated unevenly because punishment could be 
                                            
42 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-work/anglo-american-lafarge 
43 OFT, Decision proposed joint venture between Anglo American plc and Lafarge S.A. (ME/5007/11) 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/mergers_ea02/2011/anglo-american-lafarge.pdf. There had been 
price letters and customer allocation claims in other products but these were considered less binding 
and concerns were lower. 
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targeted specifically against a firm that deviated by gaining contracts from its 
existing customer base in the coordinated segment. The firm that was doing 
the punishing would usually have lost some sales due to the initial deviation 
and would be mainly replacing these lost sales by winning some business 
from the rival that was responsible so would face minimal cost (or capacity 
requirements) from this. The punishment could be in the same local area 
where the deviation occurred to increase transparency among the 
competitors’ sales staff in that area. In fact the OFT considered that this 
punishment could work following a tit-for-tat strategy where losses are 
immediately (next period) matched with a punishment to increase the impact 
they would have. Tit-for-tat maintains the possibility of future collusion by 
allowing the firm that deviated to be rewarded by restarting the arrangement 
as soon as it starts to coordinate (as long as it has not made a profit from the 
deviation).44 
Only a few examples of switching by ready mix customers were observed and 
these examples may not have been evidence of actual competition or even 
punishments. The switching may have been due to coordinating firms 
adjusting supply patterns (reducing transport costs) as industry capacity was 
reduced and suppliers moved production to different regions. Thus the 
customer allocation between the domestic cement producers may have been 
very stable and transparent over time.45 This is especially true because of the 
level of chatter in the industry and meetings between the producers where 
major customers could be discussed.46 If firms can agree a lessening of 
competition for their customers they have more freedom to set higher prices 
                                            
44 As above. Paragraph 327 states that the punishment piecemeal and 330 says it could be tit-for-tat. 
The possibility was also considered that the customer allocation could be geographic, even if just for 
larger customers (paragraph 271). There was however evidence that Lafarge supplied some 
customers close to where competitors were based so customer allocation appeared clearer 
(paragraph 319). 
 
45 As above. At paragraph 328 it is noted that few (large) ready-mix concrete customers switched. It 
is possible that a few instances of switching could have been realised punishment that was needed to 
maintain the agreement. These episodes of punishment would not result in an overall fall in prices 
affecting all customers but just a retaliation involving a few customers  
46  As above. At paragraph 315 of the OFT decision is a discussion of stealing too many customers 
given the industry tacit understanding and stable relationships. The “chatter” that allows firms to 
know each other’s strengths in different areas is discussed at paragraph 297. Everyone knows who 
supplies whom and refusal to supply certain customers can be monitored despite price dispersion 
(paragraph 296). 
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to those customers without restraint, even if they have not agreed what those 
prices will be. In other words the “tacit agreement” in essence was that if you 
steal too many customers from us we will target your business and steal your 
customers.  
Even if an agreement was based on a customer focal point price 
announcements could still be useful. Price announcements could be part of 
gaining tacit agreement and indicating the benefits of any collusion, it may 
also help to gain support for the plans among the coordinating firms because 
a deviation from the understanding by not sending a letter would be detected 
and would indicate potential risks of other deviations. The letters help the 
members bargain with their customers. Customers can see no option but to 
accept the price rise in the face of general industry price pressure so 
investigate potential outside options less thoroughly.  
For the UK cement producers their largest customers may be in a different 
downstream market to many of their other customers. The largest customers 
may be those that have large scale economies and produce ready-mix 
concrete. Many of the other cement customers could be making blocks or tiles 
at a lower scale or using less cement. Ready-mix concrete producers may 
have fewer alternatives outside of the domestic producers because their 
process may be less suitable for using imports. Ready mix producers require 
greater volumes reliably at short notice and at high quality because their 
output (concrete) is needed at specific times and cannot be stored. Thus it 
could be possible for cement price rises to be externally stable even if the 
effect was limited to these larger customers. Such an effect would not be 
undermined by entry (due to high capital costs), imports, or competition from 
buyers that are not affected by the price rise (who are not able to produce 
ready-mix concrete).  
The merger that was considered in this case may have made any 
coordination more stable. The smaller cement producer of the merging parties 
was Tarmac. Tarmac had a greater interest than other domestic cement 
producers to keep prices low, because it was a net buyer of cement for its 
large ready-mix concrete operations. Tarmac also had relatively efficient and 
modern cement production facilities and had scope to expand these to meet 
more of its cement requirements and increase industry supply. The merger 
would have eliminated Tarmac’s need to buy cement on the open market or 
expand its production, because it combined its large internal demand with the 
largest cement producer that had very little downstream operations. Thus all 
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firms would have a similar demand and supply balance post merger. The 
merger would have removed from cement production a firm that had a 
preference for low cement prices because of its position as a net buyer of 
cement. This meant that Tarmac was less likely to act as a maverick in the 
future and the merged firm would have similar incentives and downstream 
operations as the remaining domestic producers.47 
As the OFT noted, the coordination in this market did not have to be complete 
and there was no sharp line between complete collusion in the market and 
none. All that was required for the merger to be problematic was that the 
merger could make existing tacit collusion tendencies stronger and make the 
potential for coordination stronger or more reliable in future.48 Although there 
was still some asymmetry post merger the market would be more symmetric 
than before. In this case the customer allocation provided the monitoring and 
transparency for an agreement, the concentrated market with large numbers 
of customers that could be used for punishment provided the internal stability, 
and the limited outside options for customers producing ready-mix concrete 
provided the external stability. 
Competition Commission Aggregates Market Investigation 
In January 2014, for the first time, the UK Competition Commission49 found 
that a market was not functioning properly (without finding any specific breach 
of competition law that would incur a fine) and required remedies (including 
divestment) on the basis of coordinated effects. The nature of the apparent 
coordination in the market appears to be similar to the aspects of a customer 
allocation situation. The findings of this investigation are discussed as well as 
some other literature related to coordination. 
The CC has recently determined that the market for cement in Great Britain is 
subject to potential coordination and has required the divestment of a cement 
plant and two measures to reduce industry transparency.50 It is instructive to 
                                            
47 As above. Tarmac may have been a Maverick because it was a net buyer of cement (paragraph 
344). 
48 As above. See paragraph 264. 
49 In April 2014 the functions of The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and Competition Commission (CC) 
will be brought together under the new Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). 
50Competition Commission Aggregates, Cement, and Concrete Market Investigation Final Report: 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/2012/aggregates-
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examine the treatment of coordination in this report, the differences between 
the three markets considered (aggregates, cement, and ready-mix concrete 
(RMX)), and the reasoning for the remedies chosen. 
Competition concerns were not considered a risk in the aggregates (or RMX) 
markets. Customers in the two aggregates case study areas (where the 
majors had high market shares) considered that independents were suitable 
alternatives. The internal documents suggested that firms were trying to grow 
share and encourage customers to switch. 
However the aggregates market shared some aspects with the cement 
market because prices were potentially transparent from customers sharing 
competitor quotes with suppliers and cross sales between the majors. There 
were regional meetings of managers of the suppliers and shared sites. In the 
aggregates market (as in cement) firms regularly sent price announcement 
letters at similar times of the year, but it was not clear to what extent the 
announced prices resulted in actual price increases. 51 
Coordination in aggregates was ruled out because despite the homogenous 
product there was significant geographic differentiation between the suppliers 
in each market and wide variation in competitive conditions in local markets, 
as well as the evidence on low profits and margins.52 However the report did 
not appear to consider that varied local geographic markets with some firms 
not active in some local markets may allow coordination on a geographic 
basis and geographic differentiation between firms in those areas would not 
rule out coordination if these issues could be discussed at regional meetings. 
There may be simply too many local markets to detect any subset where local 
coordination could be feasible without documents to point in that direction. 
                                            
cement-and-ready-mix-concrete/140114_aggregates_final_report.pdf. Similar price letter and 
customer allocation concerns had been investigated in other cases in the sector including, OFT, 
Decision proposed joint venture between Anglo American plc and Lafarge S.A. (ME/5007/11) 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/mergers_ea02/2011/anglo-american-lafarge.pdf. Competition 
Commission Anglo American/Lafarge merger report (http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/our-work/anglo-american-lafarge, 2012). 
51 Ibid paragraphs 26, 6.100, 6.108. There was considered to be no coordination in RMX because of 
low entry barriers, multiple different local markets, and low profits despite the majors having a 66% 
share nationally (9.71). 
52 Paragraph 6.132. 
51  
 
Competition Commission findings in the Cement market: 
Market outcomes in cement appeared very different to those in aggregates 
with higher margins, and profits and relatively stable market shares despite 
significant excess capacity. Although some structural aspects of the GB 
cement market may be similar to the aggregates market, one difference was 
that in contrast to the regular bidding for individual tenders in the aggregates 
and RMX markets the cement market shows relative customer longevity and 
longer contracts. This allows customer allocations to be much more 
transparent. In a traditional model of price or market share based coordination 
there is a single market clearing price. In the cement market there was found 
to be no clear market price because of wide price discrimination (that did not 
appear to be explained by cost factors), in fact the report noted that the firms 
that switched supplier tended to secure lower prices, which suggests firms 
were implementing any agreement on a customer by customer basis and not 
market wide.53 The analysis conducted by the CC found that there was 
limited difference between how firms treated the different customers in the 
market and in fact all customers could have been subject to any such 
agreement. The suppliers were considered to compete equally for large 
customers and small ones (the customer base was concentrated), although 
they did target the customers using imports. 
In the cement market the CC found that firms monitored both the share of 
sales (including by using market data) and the customer switching. Although 
the CC concluded that the sales share was the focal point in fact the customer 
switching data gathered by the firms could lead to the share estimates. It was 
considered that the share data and the customer switching were both 
transparent which could give the relative shares of the 3 firms thought to be 
potentially colluding. There was also reference to firms targeting 
compensatory volume. The report acknowledged that in order to distinguish a 
deviation from collusion (a customer that was induced to start buying from 
                                            
53 7.3, 7.181, 12.4. Thus they did not appear to sacrifice profits on existing customers when targeting 
other suppliers in a way that could be a punishment. 
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another colluding firm) to other market changes or exits then it was necessary 
to monitor win and loss data.54 
The report found that when market share was below target firms would focus 
their offers at particular customers in tit for tat strategies. Tit for tat strategies 
were used for a short-term rebalancing of the market share and in targeting 
customers. Tit for tat could also be implemented by changing cross-sales 
(such as reducing purchases from a particular competitor) or targeting the 
customers of a specific competitor.55  These tit for tat strategies could be 
used to punish in the short term alongside a wider price war that could be 
implemented for larger deviations.  
There was some evidence of the parties share in industry data changing over 
the period and thus the firms often appeared to be trying to increase their 
market share to meet the target share. The parties suggested that constant tit 
for tat action was not consistent with periods of punishment, but instead 
represented competition. However, the CC argued that this was a regular 
rebalancing of share of sales and deterrence.56 
Although the market wide share of the top 3 firms was changing this was not 
necessarily caused by any deviation from a coordinated understanding. The 
main reasons for share change over the period (2008-2012) was due to 
growing imports, and expansion by Tarmac, both of which were not subject to 
any arrangement. There was also a significant fall in market demand and 
Hanson switched significant purchases from external suppliers to internal 
supplies.57 These changes may have caused the absolute shares of the 
three largest firms to fall and also (by potentially affecting the customers of 
                                            
54 8.68, 8.215. Other changes including a customer buying from the fringe suppliers consisting of 
imports or Tarmac (that was not considered part of the collusion) or a customer stopping purchases 
merely due to a change in market or customer demand. 
55 8.96, 8.152, 8.253 
56 8.263. 
57 Hanson had merged RMX and cement production together in 2007 and had then internalised its 
purchases by reducing a lot of external purchases in 2009 (7.230). Lafarge being the largest firm in the 
potential agreement may have taken on more of the costs of accommodating expansion of the fringe. 
It was not necessary for coordination to be perfect for it to have harmed competition in the market. 
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one more than the others) could have caused their relative shares to change 
enough that redistribution of customers was required (in a reciprocal way) 
without this being caused by a deviation. 
Some of the evidence of these events supports the view that customer 
switching was more relevant to the firms than sales volume. Lafarge appeared 
to have specifically targeted the customers of Hanson rather than the general 
market in order to regain its position after Hanson had reduced its purchases 
from Lafarge.58  The report found that the pattern of interaction was not 
consistent with competition because the objective of gaining market share 
was dependent on market share having been lost, and the additional volume 
had been targeted to be won from a particular firm rather than the whole 
market. 
In addition to these market changes, the fall in demand led to some GB 
cement plant closures. Some of the competition seen in the market may have 
been from firms targeting high quality or profitable customers within their 
share allowance, this resulted in what appeared to be imperfect coordination, 
but was partly due to rebalancing cost of delivering to customers to the new 
production locations after the plant closures. Thus some flux or long term 
changes in the market may have been adapted to via these targeting of 
particular customers, rather than this always acting as a punishment.59 
Prices in the market were considered potentially observable because of 
customers quoting prices they have been offered and from cross sales with 
other suppliers. Neither of these routes is particularly reliable. The customers 
can exaggerate about what price it has been offered as a negotiation method. 
Awareness of this is demonstrated in internal documents.60 The report also 
notes that the cross-sales made between the majors (suppliers) are made at 
higher prices than the sales to independents. Thus although these cross sales 
                                            
58 7.235 f, 8.264. However, on an annualised basis the wins and losses between the top 3 firms did not 
match in an obvious pattern on the partial data analysed (7.179). 
59 8.228 
60 8.207, 8.188, 7.229. 
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quotes can be used for cheap talk or signalling desired prices they do not 
necessarily give information about actual prices. 
The report found that there was high correlation in prices between the 
allegedly coordinating firms. However, there was also high correlation with the 
(non-coordinating) importers, and some of the higher correlation for the GB 
producers may be related to the timing of the price rises rather than the level 
because the contractual arrangements importers and producers have with 
their customers are different. Any pricing similarity between firms in the 
market may be due to the interaction of customers with the competitive fringe 
and not from any particular price monitoring by the allegedly colluding firms. 
This is supported by the fact that pricing was not found to be the focal point. 
However there was some evidence of potential price leadership discussions in 
the industry meetings.61 
It was considered whether the asymmetry between firms meant that they 
would have lower incentives to coordinate. However, it was found that despite 
smaller firms having greater incentives to expand given their small share of 
the collusive profits, these firms also had lower capacity limits and so were 
less able to supply a large proportion of the market and would have less to 
gain from supplying at full capacity (deviating), so asymmetry did not prevent 
coordination.62 
Remedies required by the Competition Commission: 
The CC decided to implement three remedies in relation to the coordination 
on the market for cement. A divestiture of one of the plants of the largest firm 
(Lafarge) as well as two measures to reduce transparency in the market; 
stopping generic price increase letters and reducing the frequency and 
timeliness of industry data. The divestiture was considered to increase the 
external constraint on the merged firm more than it would affect the 
                                            
61 7.218, 8.71. 
62 8.314. This also applied to the asymmetry between the firms in the level of vertical integration, but 
significantly each of the main three firms was usually a net seller of cement and so was keen to expand 
cement profits. 
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monitoring or internal operation of any arrangement.63 The sites to be 
divested were currently operating at full capacity, but an additional provider 
should still alter transparency and internal stability. Any reduction in 
concentration should reduce the risk from any form of coordination. 
The pricing letters sent in the cement market involved Lafarge initiating the 
price rise on half the occasions. The actual price rise achieved after these 
letters were sent was often over 50% of the advertised price rise, but 
sometimes there was no increase after a letter. It is not clear from the report 
how different these results of achieved price rises are from the markets where 
such letters were not considered problematic such as in aggregates. The 
letters were considered important in this case because when more firms sent 
letters together the implementation of the price rise was more effective.64 
However, it may be the case that in periods when cost rises are more 
prevalent (there are stronger arguments for a price rise) letters are more likely 
to be sent together, there is not necessarily strong evidence that the mere 
presence of the letters led to the greater price rise. 
The report concluded that targeting market share was consistent with 
coordination in market share rather than constant competition for share. The 
final description of the method of coordination stated that the focal point was 
the share of GB sales made by each of the GB producers (i.e. excluding any 
effects due to imports).65 The government department (BIS) appears to 
publish cement production data but the trade association (MPA) does not. 
These data sources may not fully reveal the necessary data for this focal 
point. Given that the CC report seems to accept that Tarmac was not involved 
in the behaviour the most suitable measure of volume share for any 
                                            
63 13.23. There was also a remedy to deal with a related market where Hanson had market power and 
may have increased prices to the maximum level at which it started to face increased competition (may 
have been a cellophane fallacy). The new operator of the Tarmac production facilities (HCM) was larger 
in terms of GB production than Tarmac had been, but was now long in cement (a net seller) so that it 
had less incentive to act as a maverick and force cement prices down for the benefit of its downstream 
business. The change in ownership of the Hope facility and other market changes were not considered 
enough to repudiate the conclusions of the investigation. 
64 7.207 
65 8.127, 8.208, 13.149. This means that the top 3 would target a proportion of the GB market for 
supplying GB produced cement. 
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agreement may be the share of each of the top 3 firms relative to each other 
(and maybe only for RMX customers). This specific data is not obviously 
available from the aggregated data in these sources. 
Comments on the Remedies: 
It is not clear whether the data that is being made more difficult to obtain via 
the information remedies was the key mechanism for monitoring or 
punishment in the market. Even with the ban on generic price letters to be 
implemented it will still be possible to quote the same percentage price rise to 
all customers and these can be shared (in redacted form) with others in the 
market. As long as the letters are suggested (not final) prices and can be 
negotiated over then they may still serve the same purpose as the current 
price letters by coordinating the timing of price rises and indicating to the 
market the degree of proposed increases to encourage industry acceptance 
of negotiated increases. 
The report identified aspects of the market that led to transparency over any 
customer allocation or wins and losses (such as single sourcing at a particular 
job site). Most of the measures that could tackle these directly would be best 
taken by customers. Customers could stop providing clear information about 
their total (or site specific) demand and just require quotes for particular 
volumes. Purchases could move towards multi-sourcing or at least regularly 
changing arrangements leaving suppliers unsure whether a fall in orders was 
due to output or a switch to one or more current suppliers. Importantly, if any 
coordinating firms consider that a customer has switched (or may have 
switched) to an importer (rather than another member of the coordinating 
group) they are more likely to offer a competitive price and the customers who 
have switched in the past have benefited from this. 
Looking at how the market explained in this investigation compared to the 
traditional model of a price (or market share) cartel it can be seen that in this 
market small firms have strong incentives to deviate. Just like a traditional 
model (unlike some customer or geographic allocation situations) there are 
few fixed costs to supplying new customers (at least until the point is reached 
at which their limited capacity is utilised, and subject to them finding sufficient 
potential customers that are not locked into contracts). However, unlike 
traditional models it is cheap to punish these firms because they (and their 
customers) can be specifically targeted without harming wider industry profits 
and so any deviation by them does not have to be accommodated. The 
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importance of symmetry in the market was rejected in this case, and it was 
unclear whether the ability to directly monitor price or market share was 
important for the functioning of any agreement. 
Analysis of Coordinated effects in Merger analysis using Focal Points 
Having outlined some of the key differences between collusive strategies that 
use price, geographic, and customer focal points, a key question now is; how 
to apply this in practice. Whether looking at a merger analysis or a more 
general investigation of whether there are competition concerns in a market, a 
good first step will be to establish whether there are signs of existing tacit or 
explicit collusion in the market.  
However, looking at a market to interpret the past behaviour of firms is not 
easy. In particular, how do you distinguish between a competitive 
interpretation of observed market behaviour or data and a tacitly coordinated 
interpretation? This uncertainty is perfectly reasonable considering that, if 
prices move in parallel this could reflect both effective competition, or tacit 
coordination.  Similarly if there is low customer switching that can be equally 
uninformative.  It may appear that there will almost always be a credible 
interpretation of observed market data that is consistent with effective 
competition.  So how do competition authorities deal with this problem of 
identification? 
The first step in understanding the past actions in a market is to determine 
which focal points could be used for a collusive outcome. In order to 
determine if the industry under consideration is vulnerable to coordination 
around one of these focal points, it will first be necessary to determine which 
potential focal points may be transparent to the firms and could be the basis 
of an agreement (either tacit or explicit). Once the relevant focal points have 
been established it is possible to examine market behaviour to test if it is 
consistent with coordination around these focal points. 
Price/output focal points: Markets where firms or industry associations 
regularly publish individual or market wide transaction prices or output could 
be susceptible. Consider whether the winning prices or volumes of key 
contracts are announced, or whether firms have (advance or up-to-date) price 
comparison tools or detailed data on their competitors’ offerings and 
production. Is the market fairly homogenous such that a single number for 
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price or output volume could give a good indication of a firm’s competitive 
position. 
Geographic focal point: Sectors, where local markets are served by a 
limited number of national/regional competitors who meet regularly, could be 
considered. It must be difficult to supply a local market or route without being 
present in a way that is transparent to competitors. Each of the firms that are 
potentially colluding must have some profitable areas where they are keen to 
discourage entry. Prices and terms in these areas should be set mainly in 
relation to current competition or consumer demand elasticity and not the 
threat of potential entry (which would mean that all areas were approximately 
equally profitable). Geographic focal points work better where there are 
reasonable but not large barriers to entry (or if there are many small local 
markets). If there are larger barriers to entry the threat of retaliation against 
other areas may become less credible and collusion could break down 
because once the large cost of entry has been incurred it is unlikely that 
collusion can be re-established by incentivising the firm to exit. 
Customer focal point: Products are relatively homogenous or at least all 
firms can supply all large customers with little specialism or technical skill built 
up to supply individual requirements. If there are large customers who tend to 
keep the same supplier for long periods, markets are more likely to be 
vulnerable to a customer focal point. Homogenous product markets are more 
likely to have low switching costs and so firms in a competitive market could 
easily gain new customers and drive profits down in the absence of collusion. 
If firms differentiate themselves by meeting specific customer needs then 
even if that firm deviates from any agreement they may not be subject to 
strong retaliation because other firms cannot quickly replicate their offering to 
their customers. Where the product is more homogenous customers may be 
more willing to take the risk of using only one supplier (single sourcing) 
because other suppliers can be brought on quickly if there is any supply 
disruption. Single sourcing and long term relationships (even if contracts can 
be cancelled quickly if needed) increase transparency and lead to a greater 
chance that firms will be aware which competitor a lost customer has switched 
to and thus detect deviation. 
All of these focal points are more likely to raise concern about coordinated 
effects in mergers that significantly increase concentration and general 
transparency. This will be particularly the case in a merger that only leaves 
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two significant firms. There is also greater risk in markets where there are few 
external constraints (potential entry, imports, buyer power, or substitutes). 
Identifying Potential Coordination: 
Once the potentially transparent focal point has been identified, examine how 
stable the market allocation has been based on this focal point, and whether 
the market appears to exhibit existing coordination around this focal point. 
Firms that use price focal points to coordinate will often increase prices only 
infrequently or at fixed periods (such as after meetings) and will all increase 
prices at the same time to the same extent. In output focal point markets the 
market shares, or ratio of sales made by the coordinating firms, may be very 
stable from year to year. There may be means of keeping to these relative 
sales levels such as arrangement to buy finished products from other 
members of the agreement to align sales with the agreed amount.  
If firms are keeping to a geographic allocation there will be few examples of 
entry against other firms (and particularly other large firms that are part of the 
agreement). Entry against smaller firms or into new markets may be more 
likely than going into well developed markets despite entering against larger 
firms not necessarily having any lower risk of failure, for instance, from a lack 
of customer demand.  
In customer allocation the market may see few examples of customers 
changing supplier. It could be more likely for smaller customers to change 
supplier than the larger customers, even if these customers have higher 
switching costs. 
Any situations where the (potential) coordinated outcome appears to have 
been violated by the actions of the suspected firms could be examined. This 
would include past price wars or increases in competition such as during 
periods of geographic entry or customer switching.  
It is important to check whether the target company in the merger was the 
initial deviator in past periods of competition (i.e. acted as a maverick at that 
time by cutting prices or winning customers first after a period of relative 
stability). This firm may have been playing a disruptive role in the market to 
the benefit of consumers. It may have been a leader for its price cutting 
policies or had a new technology, or it was not a member of a trade 
association where the geographic or customer allocations were agreed. 
Alternatively it may not face a threat of punishment because it did not have 
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geographic areas at risk of entry by the colluding firms or it had long term 
contracts with customers that prevented them reacting to improved offers by 
competitors. 
Check whether there appears to have been some sort of punishment after the 
initial deviation. Punishment would include targeted entry or retaliation (e.g. 
targeting customers) by other firms that mostly harms the specific firm that 
started the deviation. This is different to a more pro-competitive reaction to a 
loss of sales (i.e. market share recovery to ensure the firm’s internal targets 
are achieved). Competitive responses may be spread across many markets 
where the firm that lost sales believes it can expand profitably and do not 
target any particular competitor. Punishment can also be carried out by firms 
that did not face any initial loss of sales so may appear to have no incentive to 
change strategy in a competitive market but nonetheless target their response 
against the firm that deviated first.  
Just the mere presence of price wars and sudden changes in competition or 
strategy may indicate firms are trying to influence the actions of their 
competitors rather than a competitive scenario that may have fewer reasons 
for temporary dramatic changes in margins. However, competitive firms will 
change prices to reflect cost changes and will react to new market 
opportunities and marketing or product innovation opportunities. They can 
sometimes trigger price wars or reduced margins by misinterpreting the cause 
of changes in the market. 
As well as examining whether competitive reactions suitably explain any 
periods of instability based on a particular focal point, it may also be possible 
to consider how strong the competitive explanation is for periods of relative 
stability. Would you expect a competitive market with these features to be so 
stable? Thus when considering a customer allocation focal point there could 
be many reasons for lack of switching in competitive markets. The lack of 
switching may be due to the suppliers not bidding or attempting to enter new 
areas or could be merely the customers’ lack of interest or search including 
high switching costs. If suppliers are failing to bid (or making uncompetitive 
bids) this does not necessarily imply collusion because there could be cost 
reasons that explain why few firms are able to compete such as transport 
costs or firms may have limited capacity and need to maintain the ability to 
supply sudden extra or unpredictable orders from existing customers. Thus it 
would be important to test out whether the firms that are not competitive in 
bidding should be expected to be that expensive in a competitive market. 
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Similarly if geographic entry is not occurring that could be because the market 
is fairly stable with limited growth in sales or area populations or the firms 
have limited access to capital for new growth. Existing profits may be low 
leading to limited incentive to expand. If there are no competitive reasons for 
a lack of new entry then a collusive explanation appears more likely. 
As well as considering how consistent the market outcomes are with either a 
competitive or a collusive reasoning, it is possible to consider how any 
agreement may be coming about. If there is no opportunity for firms to reach 
an understanding then concern should be lower. Any public messages by 
firms that suggest they will react in a particular way to their competitors or to a 
loss of business should be examined for whether this response would act as a 
punishment and how effective it would be at deterring competition.  
This may include price matching guarantees. For instance, if a firm threatens 
to respond to a price cut of a particular product at a rival store by taking out 
adverts outside the store telling potential customers of that store that they can 
obtain lower prices on that product at its stores, then this would be likely to 
deter the firm from cutting this price. The customers that would use it stores 
may be more likely to stop if additional marketing suggesting it was expensive 
appeared outside its stores.  
It is also useful to test whether there are systems or forums where a potential 
agreement can be communicated privately. This could be quite a broad range 
of possibilities including if the main firms are members of trade associations 
and meet regularly. It could be relevant whether the firms tend to recruit staff 
from competitors frequently or socialise with employees from competing firms. 
These types of behaviour may be more likely where there are few employers 
in a local area that is specialised in an industry or where the industry is 
particularly specialised and requires skills that do not easily translate to other 
markets. 
An Updated Checklist: 
Having considered existing indicators for how coordination may be initiated 
and how it may be possible to detect existing collusion in markets which are 
using geographic or customer allocations, it is now possible to review the 
original list of factors that may be conducive to (price or output) coordination 
to see if they still apply to coordination using geographic or customer focal 
points: 
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Structural factors: 
 Homogeneous products, lack of innovation. This can be useful, but 
unlike in price focal points where the key is ensuring there are no non-
price aspects of competition that can be used to undermine a price 
agreement in the eyes of customers (i.e. customers view them as 
similar), the key in geographic or customer allocation is that products 
are similar as far as the suppliers are concerned and that all firms in 
the market are equally able to supply all the products (regardless of the 
cost to the suppliers of this) with limited specialised know-how. 
 Transparency of price or other terms of sale. Timely disaggregated 
data, industry communication, market reports, associations, and 
government regulation. If using geographic or customer allocation it is 
not necessary to have transparent information on price or output. It 
may still be necessary to have communication of a general sort (i.e. 
about industry developments or customer or geographic strategies) 
and this communication may need to be more frequent if the messages 
are not explicit in order to build up sufficient understanding and 
agreement tacitly. 
 High entry barriers (history of entry, minimum efficient scale). For all 
collusion it must be difficult for other firms to replicate the skills and 
position of the colluding group. However, for members of this group it 
must be relatively easy to enter different areas or supply new 
customers if they want to retaliate and enforce a collusive allocation. 
This may mean that entrants can also supply at the local level. 
However, as long as it takes sufficient time to enter enough areas and 
customers then the incumbents can respond before an entrant gains 
the resources to defend its markets and before its cost base is efficient 
enough to enter and expand rapidly. If each new local entry or 
expansion has some sunk cost (which is larger for entrants than 
incumbents) and incumbent firms can respond to this rapidly then 
incumbents will be able to cause entrants to exit before they have 
recouped these fixed costs so entry is unprofitable. Other entrants are 
discouraged. 
Supply factors: 
 Past cartels or a history of collusion. This one is still relevant. Particular 
attention should be paid to which focal points were used. 
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 Market concentration, oligopolistic market. Collusion is still easier with 
a smaller group of firms that have to learn the agreement in the 
industry. However, it is not necessary for the agreement to cover all 
operations and so it is possible that only certain identifiable segments 
of the market (such as those with higher quality standards) are 
oligopolistic. 
 Homogenous firms (market shares, capacity, and cost structure). If a 
firm has a much lower cost than its rivals then it may act as a maverick 
so some cost symmetry may be necessary for collusion. It may not be 
necessary for incumbent firms to have much spare capacity, because 
punishment can be targeted. It may not be necessary for firms to be 
equal size because a small firm that is not able to pay for all the sunk 
costs necessary to expand dramatically may realise that even in an 
competitive market it could not gain a large share. Thus it may be 
willing to settle for its low market share with high profits (due to 
collusion) rather than try to expand. The small firm may have only a 
small capacity and so be unable to supply much of the market. This is 
in contrast to some theories of coordination that assume all firms can 
supply a large part of the market or have no cost of expanding. 
 Stability of market shares. If market shares are based on sales 
volumes or values then these may not be stable. Firms that are used to 
maintaining coordination based on long term areas or customers may 
allow members of the agreement to keep short term windfalls that 
occur when some of their customers or markets expand. Competitors 
in the industry may not even be aware of all the sales a rival firm is 
making in its allotted markets as long as it is not trespassing on their 
areas. Collusion could also be limited to certain profitable markets or 
certain large customers and so looking at volume or value in the whole 
market may hide collusion in a part of it. 
 Elimination of maverick. This is still relevant but the definition of a 
maverick may change. It is not only a firm that has a low marginal cost 
and is keen to expand and supply the whole market. A firm with low 
sunk costs of entry or expansion or who is difficult to punish because it 
does not have areas at risk of retaliation or has long term contracts 
with its customers could be seen as a maverick. A firm that does not 
realise there is an agreement and may enter reducing the profits of 
industry firms could also be a maverick. 
 Bid rotation and patterns in auction markets. Geographic and customer 
allocations are not relevant to auction markets. The auction could be to 
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win a customer or an area but the process of coordination would 
always be the same as under the existing models. 
 Available excess capacity. At least some firms require the ability to 
expand into supplying new customers or areas in order for coordination 
to be necessary to prevent this entry (although they do not need to 
keep this capacity ready to use immediately). However, some firms can 
retaliate against entry with very little excess capacity. Punishment 
could occur after a slight delay especially if entrants have sufficient 
sunk cost of entry that they will not have recovered this by the time the 
punishment occurs and will still suffer a loss from the entry attempt. 
 Vertical integration. This may not be relevant because it may not 
increase any transparency over geographic or customer allocations, 
but it may give more scope for communication and reaching 
agreement. 
 Multi market contact. This can increase coordination, but if the market 
consists of lots of customers (that are being competed for or allocated) 
or lots of local markets then these can turn into the multiple markets. 
Firms in these industries could be unable to gain a large part of the 
entire industry sales in a short period and there may be greater 
opportunity to retaliate. 
 Structural links (minority stakes, joint venture). This can still be useful 
for coordination in terms of aligning incentives and increasing 
communication. 
 Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFNC). Price transparency is not 
necessary so this is not needed. A clause like this may make it harder 
to exploit market power in particular areas or with particular customers 
because it would not be possible to give these firms a guarantee that 
they were getting the best prices. 
 Price matching guarantees. Again price transparency and threats or 
punishment related to that focal point are not required. If prices 
charged to different customers or areas are required to be the same it 
may actually undermine collusion based on customer or geographic 
allocation because it is harder to exploit market power for some 
customers or areas. 
Demand factors: 
 Stability of demand (unpredictable fluctuations or growth). Coordination 
may still be possible with some demand instability. If all areas or 
customers are growing or changing at the same (unpredictable) rate 
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then coordination is still possible because this does not affect the 
allocation. It is still difficult for firms to incur sunk costs and expand to 
new areas or customers in a falling market so expansion and deviation 
may be discouraged. Even if some parts of the market were benefiting 
more from demand changes than others the extent of these differences 
in the allocation may not be that great if most firms have both growth 
and decline areas in different parts of the country. If firms are benefiting 
differently from the growth of certain areas the extent of this difference 
may not be clear or transparent to competitors (or only with a lag by 
which time it is too late to take advantage of this). Even if firms realise 
they are losing out due to demand growth they may delay responding if 
they have limited ability to expand rapidly and the profits they are 
gaining on their existing reserved areas or customers are large enough 
to discourage them from causing increased competition and low profits 
for everyone. Firms are more likely to compete in when the fortunes of 
firms are altered by market growth if managers are rewarded based on 
their relative performance compared to their competitors rather than on 
absolute profits. 
 Frequency of interaction (sales patterns and pricing patterns). This can 
be interpreted as the number of local markets that can be allocated or 
how many concentrated high profit local markets or important 
customers there are. The market is more likely to be coordinated if 
entering supply of each of these will have a new sunk cost (e.g. if large 
customers require marketing material or a change of packaging that is 
specific to them). It is particularly important that any entrants should 
have a significant sunk cost to supplying the key customers or markets. 
 Inelastic demand and import restrictions. This is still important. 
 Buyer power (sponsoring entry, re-designing product or process, or 
relations in other markets). Still important. 
As well as these previous factors, it is possible to suggest some new 
additional or alternative indicators to be considered when geographic or 
customer allocation could be possible:  
Customer churn: Whether the market appears to be stable in relation to the 
customers allocated to each supplier. Larger customers will normally be more 
attractive to competitors than smaller ones (who may have higher switching 
costs or search costs) so if the larger customers change supplier less often 
this may indicate competition is lower in this segment. This is especially true if 
the lack of switching by larger customers is due to a lack of attempts by 
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competitors to win these customers despite their accounts being more 
valuable and if the suppliers have lower customer acquisition costs than the 
customers’ switching costs. 
Geographic churn: Whether entry is more likely into markets where there is no 
incumbent or where small firms that are not part of the agreement are present 
than into markets where other large firms are operating. Is this the case even 
if the routes or areas that are not entered are dominated by a few incumbents 
and appear to be the most profitable ones. 
Sudden changes in market conditions (such as the amount of entry and 
customer switching) that do not appear to be caused by external events such 
as new products or marketing opportunities. These increases in competition 
may end as quickly as they begin. 
A market that is conducive to geographic allocation with firms repeatedly 
interacting in many separate markets and making high profits in areas with 
few of the large national firms present. 
A market that is conducive to customer allocation with firms repeatedly 
interacting with many separate (large and valuable) customers that have long 
term relationships. Each customer is large enough for an understanding to be 
built up about that customer (maybe at a local or production site level) but is 
not large enough to be a significant part of the entire industry demand. This 
means that it is not worth sacrificing the agreement in order to win that one 
customer. 
The above elements are helpful in informing the theory of harm under 
investigation and should fit in a coherent way with the particular facts of the 
investigation. 
Conclusion  
Firms engage in coordination in order to raise profits at the expense of 
customers. This usually means that whether the agreement they reach is tacit 
or explicit it is usually designed to increase the prices they can charge their 
customers. However, even if raising prices is the objective of the agreement it 
does not mean that the new price level needs to be stated in the agreement. 
Each part of the market or each firm could have a different view of what price 
can be charged to customers and these prices do not need to have been 
discussed for the agreement to have reduced competition. 
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The agreement that firms enter into could merely outline how rivalry will be 
controlled or eliminated and leave it up to the firms how they exploit the 
greater market power this gives them.  
Focal points that are based on how firms interact including which areas or 
customers they compete for may be more transparent and easier to establish 
tacitly. More explicit agreement between firms may be needed if the 
agreement requires lots of specific actions to support it, such as exchanging 
information with competitors which may have no purpose other than to enable 
agreement.  
How targeted or effective punishment for any deviation can be depends on 
the focal point used in the agreement. Internal stability can be increased if the 
punishment can be made more severe by targeting the firm that deviated. If 
the identity of the firm that deviated as well as the fact that there has been 
deviation is transparent, then this firm can be targeted. If the market can be 
separated out so that different prices or offers are made to areas or 
customers that use that particular supplier then this firm will suffer more from 
the punishment than others in the market. Coordination elsewhere in the 
market can continue even during the punishment phase. 
Some markets where tacit coordination is thought to have led to higher prices 
appear to have used frequent communication to establish geographic or 
customer based focal points. In this summary the cement market was 
discussed for customer allocation and the bus market for geographic 
allocation.  
Several indicators have been developed for when a market may be at risk or 
suffering from coordination, particularly when this is based on price or output 
transparency. Some of these indicators will still be relevant when tacit 
coordination using customer or geographic focal points is occurring. There are 
also other means of identifying when a market could be vulnerable to these 
focal points including whether firms appear to have targeted punishment at 
those firms that initiated increases in competition.  
Regulators should also consider the extent to which firms have attempted to 
communicate to influence the expectations of competitors in order to reduce 
competition. Having a view about how a competitor would react to a change in 
competition is reasonable, but trying to make competitors more wary of your 
response to their actions, or trying to agree or discover from competitors when 
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they will respond to your actions, may indicate the start of a collusive 
agreement. 
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